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Abstract
We consider a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and compact
control spaces, which we call stochastic shortest path (SSP) games. They are undiscounted
total cost stochastic dynamic games that have a cost-free termination state. Exploiting the
close connection of these games to single-player SSP problems, we introduce novel model con-
ditions under which we show that the SSP games have strong optimality properties, including
the existence of a unique solution to the dynamic programming equation, the existence of op-
timal stationary policies, and the convergence of value and policy iteration. We then focus on
finite state and control SSP games and the classical Q-learning algorithm for computing the
value function. Q-learning is a model-free, asynchronous stochastic iterative algorithm. By the
theory of stochastic approximation involving monotone nonexpansive mappings, it is known to
converge when its associated dynamic programming equation has a unique solution and its it-
erates are bounded with probability one. For the SSP case, as the main result of this paper, we
prove the boundedness of the Q-learning iterates under our proposed model conditions, thereby
establishing completely the convergence of Q-learning for a broad class of total cost finite-space
stochastic games.
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2
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider two-player zero-sum stochastic dynamic games under the undiscounted,
total cost criterion, and we focus on those games that have a finite state space and a cost-free termi-
nation state. Our interest is in using a well-known model-free stochastic approximation algorithm,
the Q-learning algorithm, for computing the value of a game when the control spaces of both play-
ers are finite. The main purpose of this paper is to show that there is a broad class of total cost
games with desirable optimality properties for which the Q-learning algorithm converges in a totally
asynchronous setting under fairly mild conditions.
Zero-sum stochastic games were first introduced by Shapley [Sha53] for the discounted cost
criteria. Since then there have been extensive research on undiscounted stochastic games, including
games with the limiting average cost criterion, first considered by Gillette [Gil57] and developed
in the seminal works [BF68, BK76, MN81], and games with total cost and related criteria [TV87,
Fed80, Now85, Now99]. (We refer readers to the excellent book by Filar and Vrieze [FV97] for
historical and contemporary developments on stochastic games.) A general formulation of total cost
games, when one-stage costs can be positive or negative-valued, was first proposed and analyzed by
Thuijsman and Vrieze [TV87]. In this and their subsequent works (see the survey by Thuijsman and
Vrieze [TV98] and also Filar and Vrieze [FV97, Chapter 4]), they established important existence
results for finite state and control total cost games. They showed that for a total cost game to have
a finite value function, a sufficient condition is that the corresponding average-cost game has the
value zero and both players posses stationary average-cost optimal policies. They also showed that
for a total cost game to have not only a finite value function but also stationary optimal policies for
both players, a necessary and sufficient condition is that a certain system of functional equations
have solutions.
In this paper we will focus on a subset of the total cost games of the latter kind. In addition to
having a value and stationary optimal policies, the SSP games we consider also have the property that
their associated Bellman equation has a unique solution. This property relates to the convergence
of value iteration and is essential for the Q-learning algorithm we are interested in. Among the
total cost games satisfying Thuijsman and Vrieze’s necessary and sufficient conditions mentioned
earlier, the ones that will be excluded from our consideration are, briefly speaking, those games in
which from some initial state, both players can play some stationary optimal policies (and incur
zero average cost) without ever reaching the termination state. (We will discuss in Section 2.3 some
examples of such games.)
To delineate a subset of SSP games with desirable properties, we will specify conditions on
the model of the games, and we will do so in the broader context of games with compact control
sets and semi-continuous one-stage costs, which include finite-control games as special cases. (A
finite-control game can be viewed as a game with compact control sets, where controls correspond
to randomized decision rules of each player.) In the context of total cost compact-control games,
there are several earlier works [KC69, KS81, PB99], and the one by Patek and Bertsekas [PB99] is
most related to ours. They considered finite-state compact-control SSP games in which one-stage
costs can take both positive and negative values, and the termination state need not be reachable
for every initial state and every pair of policies of the two players. The term “SSP games” is, in
fact, from [PB99], and it is based on the close connection of SSP games, at both analytical and
computational level, to single-player SSP problems, which are total cost or total reward Markov
decision processes (MDP) with a termination state. (For references on SSP and total cost MDP,
see e.g., Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [BT91, BT96], Feinberg [Fei92], and Puterman [Put94].) Patek
and Bertsekas [PB99] established optimality results similar to those we aim to obtain, but under
model conditions that are asymmetric in terms of the two players and bear a strong association with
pursuit-evasion type of games.
As one of the contributions of this paper, we introduce a symmetric formulation of model con-
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ditions (Assumption 2.3). It characterizes a much broader class of SSP games than considered in
[PB99] (see Section 2.3 for a detailed comparison), and it allows the theory of single-player SSP prob-
lems (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [BT91]) to be more fully utilized in analyzing the compact-control
SSP games. As a result, we show that the desired optimality properties, including the existence of
a unique solution to the Bellman equation and the existence of a pair of equilibrium policies that
are stationary deterministic (Theorem 2.1), as well as the convergence properties of value iteration
and policy iteration (Theorem 2.2), are retained.
We then consider finite state and control SSP games that satisfy the proposed model conditions,
and we turn to the question of the convergence of the Q-learning algorithm for computing their
value functions. Q-learning was first introduced by Watkins [Wat89] in the context of MDP and
reinforcement learning, and its convergence was analyzed most comprehensively by Tsitsiklis [Tsi94]
as a special case of the convergence of asynchronous stochastic approximation algorithms. For
discounted stochastic games, Littman [Lit96] studied Q-learning and analyzed its convergence (with
a different argument than [Tsi94, Theorem 3], which also implies the convergence of Q-learning
in such games). For undiscounted SSP games whose Bellman equations admit a unique solution,
convergence of Q-learning is known in two limited cases under strong assumptions:
(i) when the game always terminates regardless how the two players play, and
(ii) when the iterates generated by Q-learning are bounded with probability one.
In both cases, the convergence of Q-learning follows from the convergence theorems of Tsitsik-
lis [Tsi94] for asynchronous stochastic approximation involving sup-norm contraction or monotone
nonexpansive mappings: convergence in the first case is due to a contraction property (Patek and
Bertsekas [PB99, Lemma 4.1]), and convergence in the second case (under the boundedness condi-
tion) follows from arguments for monotone nonexpansive mappings [Tsi94, Theorem 2]. (For more
details, see Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [BT96, Chapter 4 and Section 7.2].) Another convergence re-
sult is also known when boundedness of Q-learning iterates is not assumed, based on the results of
Abounadi, Bertsekas and Borkar [ABB02]. However, in this case, additional conditions are required
on the timing and frequency of component updates in Q-learning, which are more restrictive than
the totally asynchronous computing framework of [Tsi94].
The main contribution of this paper is a boundedness proof for the Q-learning algorithm with
totally asynchronous computation, for the broad class of SSP games satisfying our model conditions.
We show that the Q-learning iterates are bounded with probability one (Theorem 3.1), thereby
furnishing the boundedness condition required in the convergence theorem of [Tsi94] and establishing
completely the convergence of Q-learning (Theorem 3.2). Our proof techniques are based on those
constructed in Yu and Bertsekas [YB13a] for analyzing boundedness of Q-learning in single-player
SSP problems.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we consider finite-state compact-control SSP
games, and introduce our new model conditions and prove optimality results. In Section 3 we
describe finite state and control SSP games and the Q-learning algorithm. Finally, in Section 4 we
present the boundedness analysis for Q-learning.
2 A Finite-State Compact-Control SSP Game Model
2.1 Basic Definitions and Conditions
We consider a finite-state two-player zero-sum total cost stochastic game with a termination state.
Let So = S ∪ {0} be the state space, where S = {1, . . . , n} and state 0 is a cost-free termination
(absorbing) state. Two players participate in the game with opposite objectives, and their actions
jointly influence the evolution of the states through time. In particular, at each state i ∈ S, player I
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(player II, respectively) can apply a control from a set U¯(i) (V¯ (i), respectively) of feasible controls,
where U¯(i) and V¯ (i) are assumed to be compact sets in some complete separable metric space. If
the two players apply a pair of controls (u¯, v¯) ∈ U¯(i) × V¯ (i), an expected one-stage cost ci(u¯, v¯)
is incurred to player I while player II receives the same amount as an expected one-stage reward,
and the system then transitions from state i to state j ∈ So with probability pij(u¯, v¯). Here the
one-stage costs (with respect to player I) can be positive or negative. We assume that the transition
probabilities and one-stage costs satisfy the following continuity/semi-continuity conditions:
Assumption 2.1 (Continuity Condition). For all states i, j ∈ S, the transition probability pij(u¯, v¯)
is a continuous function on U¯(i)× V¯ (i), and the one-stage cost ci(u¯, v¯) is lower semicontinuous in
u¯ for fixed v¯ and upper semicontinuous in v¯ for fixed u¯.
Starting from some state i0 ∈ S at time 0, the players play for an infinite number of stages,
making control decisions based on the information of the current state and the history of the game,
which includes the past states and past controls applied by each player, while the states evolve in a
Markovian way as described above. We define the total costs for player I and the total rewards for
player II as follows.
Let ik denote the state and (u¯k, v¯k) the controls taken by the two players at time k. Let Π1,Π2
denote the sets of all history-dependent randomized policies for player I and player II, respectively
(each of such policies is a collection of Borel measurable transition probabilities from the space of
histories to the respective player’s control space). If player I adopts policy π1 ∈ Π1 and player II
π2 ∈ Π2, we define the total cost of player I (total reward of player II) for the initial state i0 = i by
xi(π1, π2) = lim inf
t→∞
Eπ1π2
[ t∑
k=0
cik(u¯k, v¯k)
∣∣ i0 = i ],
where {(ik, u¯k, v¯k), k ≥ 0} is the random process of states and controls induced by the policy pair
(π1, π2), and Eπ1π2 denotes expectation with respect to the probability distribution of the induced
process. In vector notation we write x(π1, π2) for the vector of total costs, (x1(π1, π2), . . . , xn(π1, π2)).
The optimal total cost for player I and optimal total reward for player II, for each initial state
i ∈ S, are defined to be
x¯∗i = inf
π1∈Π1
sup
π2∈Π2
xi(π1, π2), x
∗
i = sup
π2∈Π2
inf
π1∈Π1
xi(π1, π2),
respectively. An optimal policy for player I (player II) is then a policy which attains the optima for
all states in the above minimization over Π1 (maximization over Π2). We call x¯
∗
i , x
∗
i the upper and
lower value of the game for state i. If these values coincide for all states, we call the corresponding
x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) where x
∗
i = x¯
∗
i = x
∗
i , the value function of the game. We say that (π
∗
1 , π
∗
2) ∈
Π1 ×Π2 is a pair of equilibrium policies if the following holds:
x(π∗1 , π2) ≤ x(π
∗
1 , π
∗
2) ≤ x(π1, π
∗
2), ∀π1 ∈ Π1, π2 ∈ Π2.
In that case x∗ = x(π∗1 , π
∗
2) is the value function of the game, and π
∗
1 , π
∗
2 are optimal policies for the
two players.
Consider the class of stationary deterministic policies of each player, which is defined for player
I and player II by
D1 =
{
µ : S 7→ ∪i∈SU¯(i)
∣∣∣ µ(i) ∈ U¯(i), i ∈ S},
D2 =
{
ν : S 7→ ∪i∈S V¯ (i)
∣∣∣ ν(i) ∈ V¯ (i), i ∈ S},
respectively. Each function µ ∈ D1 corresponds to a policy that applies at time k the control µ(ik)
for state ik, and this policy will also be denoted by µ. We use similar notation for the policies
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corresponding to D2. We will shortly introduce model conditions that guarantee the existence of
equilibrium policies within these policies.1
With stationary policies in D1, D2, we define several dynamic programming operators on ℜn for
the game, using compact matrix and vector notation. For a pair of policies (µ, ν) ∈ D1 × D2, let
Tµν : ℜn → ℜn be given by
Tµν x = c(µ, ν) + P (µ, ν)x, x ∈ ℜ
n, (2.1)
where c(µ, ν) is the n-dimensional one-stage cost vector with components ci
(
µ(i), ν(i)
)
, and P (µ, ν)
is the n-by-n substochastic transition probability matrix with elements [P (µ, ν)]ij = pij
(
µ(i), ν(i)
)
,
i, j ∈ S. Define Tµ : ℜ
n → ℜn and Tν : ℜ
n → ℜn by
Tµx = sup
ν∈D2
{
c(µ, ν) + P (µ, ν)x
}
, T˜νx = inf
µ∈D1
{
c(µ, ν) + P (µ, ν)x
}
. (2.2)
In the right-hand sides above the optimization over D1 or D2 is component-wise.
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Finally, we define T : ℜn → ℜn and T˜ : ℜn → ℜn by
Tx = inf
µ∈D1
sup
ν∈D2
{
c(µ, ν) + P (µ, ν)x
}
, T˜ x = sup
ν∈D2
inf
µ∈D1
{
c(µ, ν) + P (µ, ν)x
}
, (2.3)
where, similar to the above, the optimization in the right-hand sides is component-wise.
A mapping H is monotone if Hx ≤ Hy for x ≤ y. Since P (µ, ν) is a nonnegative matrix, the
above mappings are monotone by definition. They also satisfy, be definition,
T˜νx ≤ Tµνx ≤ Tµx, ∀µ ∈ D1, ν ∈ D2, x ∈ ℜ
n, (2.4)
T˜νx ≤ T˜ x ≤ Tx ≤ Tµx, ∀µ ∈ D1, ν ∈ D2, x ∈ ℜ
n. (2.5)
Furthermore, Assumption 2.1 on the continuity of the state transition probabilities and the semicon-
tinuity of the one-stage costs implies that every component of Tµx is lower semicontinuous in (x, µ),
every component of T˜νx is upper semicontinuous in (x, ν), and every component of Tµνx is lower
semicontinuous in (x, µ) for fixed ν and upper semicontinuous in (x, ν) for fixed µ. Since the control
sets are compact, it then follows that under Assumption 2.1, the infimum and supremum in the
definitions of the above mappings are all attained: for every x, there exists µ such that Tx = Tµx;
for every x and µ, there exists ν such that Tµx = Tµνx; and similar relations hold for T˜ and T˜ν .
We also need a regularity condition:
Assumption 2.2 (Minimax Regularity Condition). For all x ∈ ℜn, we have Tx = T˜ x, i.e.,
inf
µ∈D1
sup
ν∈D2
Tµν x = sup
ν∈D2
inf
µ∈D1
Tµν x.
Assumption 2.2 is known to hold for cases where the control sets U¯(i) and V¯ (i) in the above math-
ematical model correspond to the sets of probability distributions over the actual control sets which
are compact, under certain continuity/semi-continuity conditions that can be weaker than Assump-
tion 2.1. (See, for instance, [Now85, Theorem 5.1]; see also the minimax theorems of Fan [Fan53] for
various conditions under which the above assumption holds.) In particular, Assumption 2.2, as well
as Assumption 2.1, is satisfied by the finite-space total cost zero-sum games that we will consider
later. Under this assumption, we refer to T or T˜ as the dynamic programming operator and the
equation x = Tx or x = T˜ x as the dynamic programming equation for the SSP game.
1Without loss of generality, we focus on stationary deterministic policies here instead of stationary randomized
policies, because our results can be applied in compact-control problems after a reformulation that let U¯(i) and V¯ (i)
represent probability distributions over the actual control sets.
2Here we use the matrix/vector notation to write n optimization problems in one expression. This is valid be-
cause of the separable structure of these problems. For example, the problem of maximizing the ith component of
c(µ, ν) + P (µ, ν)x over D2 is identical to supν(i)∈V¯ (i){ci
(
µ(i), ν(i)
)
+
∑
j∈S pij
(
µ(i), ν(i)
)
xj}. In other words, the
ith optimization problem depends only on the components of µ, ν for state i.
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2.2 An SSP Game Model and its Optimality Properties
We now introduce a novel formulation of an SSP game model. We will show that it has favorable
optimality properties, including the existence of a unique solution to the dynamic programming
equation, the existence of a pair of stationary equilibrium policies, and convergence of value and
policy iteration.
We will put model assumptions on the cost/reward of certain policies depending on whether
the termination state can be reached with probability 1 (w.p.1, for short). We need the following
definition, which uses terminologies from [PB99].
Definition 2.1 (Prolonging and Non-prolonging Policies). We say a pair of policies (π1, π2) is pro-
longing , if under these policies of the two players, there is a positive probability that the termination
state 0 is never reached for some initial state. Then, a non-prolonging pair (π1, π2) is one such that
under these policies, the termination state is reached for any initial state w.p.1.
Assumption 2.3 (SSP Game Model).
(i) There exists a policy µ¯ ∈ D1 for player I such that for any policy ν ∈ D2, xi(µ¯, ν) < +∞ for
all states i.
(ii) There exists a policy ν¯ ∈ D2 for player II such that for any policy µ ∈ D1, xi(µ, ν¯) > −∞ for
all states i.
(iii) For any pair of policies (µ, ν) ∈ D1×D2 that is prolonging, xi(µ, ν) = +∞ or −∞ for at least
one initial state i.
Assumption 2.3 has a symmetric form for the two players.3 It is much broader than the asym-
metric SSP model formulation in the earlier work [PB99], as we will explain in Section 2.3. Assump-
tion 2.3(i)-(ii) says that each player has at least one stationary policy to safeguard against infinite
loss. Assumption 2.3(iii) says that a prolonging policy pair (µ, ν) will be against the interest of some
player. It also implies that the pair (µ¯, ν¯) of policies described in Assumption 2.3(i)-(ii) cannot be
prolonging.
To derive further implications of Assumption 2.3, we consider the decision problem for one player
when the other player plays a fixed stationary policy. In that case, the problem of optimizing the
total cost or reward for one player is a total cost or reward MDP with a cost-free termination state.
For these finite-state compact-control MDP, strong optimality properties are known under certain
assumptions on the total cost/reward structure (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [BT91]). Like [PB99] on
SSP games, our SSP game model in Assumption 2.3 is also motivated by these analytical results for
single-player problems.
More specifically, let us consider a single-player problem which, when viewed as a two-player
game by assuming there is a second dummy player who has singleton control sets, satisfies the
model description in Section 2.1, including the continuity conditions in Assumption 2.1. We will
refer to such a problem as a single-player SSP problem, whether it is to minimize total costs or to
maximize total rewards. For a single-player SSP, we have from [BT91] the following notion of proper
policies and a model condition that uses this notion and leads to desirable optimality properties.
Definition 2.2 (Proper and Improper Policies in Single-Player SSP). In a single-player SSP prob-
lem, a policy is said to be proper if under that policy, the termination state is reached w.p.1 for any
initial state; the policy is said to be improper, otherwise.
3 Because of the use of liminf, the definition of the total cost function x(pi1, pi2) for a pair of general policies (pi1, pi2)
is asymmetric for the two players. However, for a pair of stationary policies (µ, ν) ∈ D1 ×D2, it can be shown that
under Assumption 2.3, the limit of the finite-stage costs (or rewards) always exists (it may be finite, +∞ or −∞).
Because of this, the model assumption we introduce is indeed fully symmetric in terms of the two players.
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The results of [BT91] show that if a single-player SSP problem satisfies the following assumption,
SSP Model Assumption: In the class of stationary deterministic policies, there exists a
proper policy, and every improper policy incurs cost +∞ for at least one initial state.
then the optimal total cost function is finite, and it is the unique solution of the dynamic program-
ming equation. Moreover, value iteration converges starting from any initial value.
Based on these results for single-player SSP, let us introduce a notion of well-behaved policies
for each player in SSP games. Let us call a policy of player I or player II essentially proper if, when
the player plays that policy, the resulting (total cost or total reward) single-player SSP problem for
the other player satisfies the SSP Model Assumption. In other words:
Definition 2.3 (Essentially Proper Policies).
(a) µ ∈ D1 is essentially proper if there exists a policy ν ∈ D2 such that (µ, ν) is non-prolonging,
and moreover, for every policy ν ∈ D2 with (µ, ν) being prolonging, xi(µ, ν) = −∞ for at least
one initial state i;
(b) ν ∈ D2 is essentially proper if there exists a policy µ ∈ D1 such that (µ, ν) is non-prolonging,
and moreover, for every policy µ ∈ D1 with (µ, ν) being prolonging, xi(µ, ν) = +∞ for at least
one initial state i.
If player I plays an essentially proper policy µ, the reward-maximization problem player II faces is
a single-player total-reward SSP with its dynamic programming operator given by T˜µ [cf. Eq. (2.2)].
Similarly, if player II plays an essentially proper policy ν, then player I has a single-player total-cost
SSP problem with its dynamic programming operator given by T˜ν [cf. Eq. (2.2)]. Hence by [BT91]
the essentially proper policies we just defined have the following property.
Lemma 2.1. Let H = Tµ or T˜ν , where µ ∈ D1 or ν ∈ D2 is essentially proper. Then the equation
x = Hx has a unique solution x¯, and limt→∞H
tx = x¯ for all x ∈ ℜn.
For any pair of essentially proper policies of the two players, we have the following fact:
Lemma 2.2. Let µ ∈ D1 and ν ∈ D2 be essentially proper. Then,
(i) (µ, ν) is non-prolonging; and
(ii) x¯(µ) ≥ x˜(ν), where x¯(µ), x˜(ν) are the unique solution of x = Tµx and x = T˜νx, respectively.
Proof. To prove (i), first we note that although for a policy µ to be essentially proper, Defini-
tion 2.3(a) does not exclude that xi(µ, ν) = +∞ for some state i and a prolonging policy pair (µ, ν),
this cannot happen. Otherwise, we can derive a contradiction by constructing a policy ν′ ∈ D2 for
player II such that (µ, ν′) is prolonging but xi(µ, ν
′) > −∞ for all states i. This policy ν′ can be
chosen as follows. Suppose xi(µ, ν) = +∞ for some state i. Then, for the Markov chain induced
by (µ, ν), by [Put94, Theorem 9.4.1, p. 472], there exists a recurrent class E such that the average
cost on E is strictly greater than 0. Let ν′ be identical to ν for states in E and identical to a policy
ν¯ for the rest of the states, where ν¯ is such that (µ, ν¯) is non-prolonging and the existence of ν¯ is
ensured by the definition of µ as an essentially proper policy. The Markov chain induced by (µ, ν′)
has two recurrent classes, E and {0}, so (µ, ν′) is prolonging, and moreover, the average cost on E,
[which is equal to the average cost on E under (µ, ν)], is strictly greater than 0. Then, by [Put94,
Theorem 9.4.1, p. 472], xi(µ, ν
′) = +∞ for all i ∈ E, while for the rest of the states i, we have that
either xi(µ, ν
′) = +∞ or xi(µ, ν′) is finite. Hence, xi(µ, ν′) > −∞ for all i, and since the pair of
policies (µ, ν′) is prolonging, this contradicts the definition of µ being essentially proper. Similarly,
in Definition 2.3(b), it cannot happen that xi(µ, ν) = −∞ for some state i and a prolonging policy
pair (µ, ν) when ν is essentially proper.
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On the other hand, when µ and ν are essentially proper, Definition 2.3 dictates that if (µ, ν)
were prolonging, there must exist some states i, j with xi(µ, ν) = −∞ and xj(µ, ν) = +∞, which is
impossible as we just argued. Therefore, the pair (µ, ν) must be non-prolonging.
We now prove (ii). Since µ and ν are essentially proper, by Lemma 2.1, the equations x = Tµx
and x = T˜νx have a unique solution. Denote x¯ = x¯(µ), x˜ = x˜(ν). Since x¯ = Tµx¯ ≥ T˜ν x¯ [cf. Eq. (2.4)]
and T˜ν is monotone, we have that for all t, x¯ ≥ T˜ tν x¯. By Lemma 2.1, limt→∞ T˜
t
ν x¯ = x˜. Therefore
x¯ ≥ x˜.
In terms of essentially proper policies, Assumption 2.3 has an important implication given below.
Lemma 2.3. Suppose Assumption 2.3 holds. Let µ ∈ D1 and ν ∈ D2. Then we have:
(i) If there exists x ∈ ℜn such that x ≥ Tµx, then µ is essentially proper.
(ii) If there exists x ∈ ℜn such that x ≤ T˜νx, then ν is essentially proper.
Moreover, every player has at least one essentially proper stationary policy—µ¯ for player I and ν¯
for player II where µ¯ and ν¯ are as in Assumption 2.3(i)-(ii).
Proof. We prove (i); the proof for (ii) is entirely symmetric. For any policy ν ∈ D2, since x ≥
Tµx ≥ Tµνx [cf. Eq. (2.4)], by the monotonicity of Tµν and the definition of xi(µ, ν), we have that
xi(µ, ν) < +∞ for any state i. Then for the policy ν¯ of player II in Assumption 2.3(ii), the pair
(µ, ν¯) must be non-prolonging by Assumption 2.3(iii), and also by Assumption 2.3(iii), for every
ν ∈ D2 such that (µ, ν) is prolonging, xi(µ, ν) = −∞ for at least one state i. By Definition 2.3(a),
this shows that µ is essentially proper.
We now prove the last statement of the lemma. Consider the policies µ¯ and ν¯ in Assumption 2.3(i)
and (ii). As discussed immediately after that assumption, the pair (µ¯, ν¯) is non-prolonging. More-
over, Assumption 2.3(i) and (iii) together imply that for any policy ν ∈ D2 such that (µ¯, ν) is
prolonging, we must have xi(µ¯, ν) = −∞ for some initial state i. Hence µ¯ is essentially proper for
player I by Definition 2.3(a). Similarly, the policy ν¯ is essentially proper for player I by Assump-
tion 2.3(ii)-(iii) and Definition 2.3(b).
We are now ready to establish the optimality properties for the proposed SSP game model. Some
of the proof steps below appear similar to those in [PB99].
Theorem 2.1 (Existence of Value and Equilibrium Policies). Under Assumptions 2.1-2.3, the game
has a finite value function x∗, which is the unique solution of the dynamic programming equation
x = Tx. Furthermore, any µ∗ ∈ D1, ν∗ ∈ D2 such that x∗ = Tµ∗x∗ = T˜ν∗x∗ are essentially proper
(hence (µ∗, ν∗) is non-prolonging). Such policies exist, and they form a pair of equilibrium policies
for the game and are optimal for each player.
Proof. We show first that T can have at most one fixed point. Suppose that both x and x′ satisfy
x = Tx and x′ = Tx′. Under Assumption 2.1, there exist stationary deterministic policies µ and µ′
such that Tµx = Tx and Tµ′x
′ = Tx′. By Lemma 2.3, both µ and µ′ are essentially proper. Since
x = Tx ≤ Tµ′x [cf. Eq. (2.5)], by the monotonicity of Tµ′ , we have that for all t, x ≤ T tµ′x. On
the other hand, since x′ = Tµ′x
′ and µ′ is essentially proper, we have by Lemma 2.1 that {T tµ′x}
converges to x′. Therefore x ≤ x′. A symmetric argument yields x′ ≤ x, and hence x = x′.
We now show that T has a fixed point. Let µ¯ ∈ D1 and ν¯ ∈ D2 be essentially proper policies,
which exist under Assumption 2.3 (Lemma 2.3). By Lemma 2.1, there exist a unique x¯ such that
x¯ = Tµ¯x¯, and a unique x˜ such that x˜ = T˜ν¯ x˜. By Lemma 2.2(ii), x¯ ≥ x˜. Since Tµ¯x¯ ≥ T x¯ and
T˜ν¯ x˜ ≤ T x˜ [cf. Eq. (2.5)], we also have x¯ ≥ T x¯ and x˜ ≤ T x˜. Using the monotonicity of T and the
fact that x¯ ≥ x˜, it follows that {T tx¯} is a non-increasing sequence bounded below by x˜ and hence
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converges to some x∗. Since T t+1x¯ = T (T tx¯), by the continuity of T , x∗ must satisfy x∗ = Tx∗.
Thus x∗ is a fixed point of T and hence the unique fixed point of T .
Now let (µ∗, ν∗) be stationary deterministic policies such that Tµ∗x
∗ = Tx∗ and T˜ν∗x
∗ = T˜ x∗;
they exist under Assumption 2.1. We have x∗ = Tµ∗x
∗ = T˜ν∗x
∗ because Tx∗ = T˜ x∗ under Assump-
tion 2.2. Lemma 2.3(i) and (ii) then imply that µ∗ and ν∗ are essentially proper, so by the result
of [BT91], x∗ is the optimal total reward function (optimal total cost function, respectively) of the
single-player SSP problem for player II (player I, respectively) when player I takes policy µ∗ (player
II takes policy ν∗, respectively). This optimality of x∗ translates to4
x(µ∗, π2) ≤ x
∗ ≤ x(π1, ν
∗), ∀π1 ∈ Π1, π2 ∈ Π2. (2.6)
We now prove x∗ = x(µ∗, ν∗). Since µ∗ and ν∗ are essentially proper, by Lemma 2.2(i), (µ∗, ν∗)
is non-prolonging. Applying the result of [BT91] to the process induced by the non-prolonging
pair (µ∗, ν∗), which can be viewed as an uncontrolled SSP with a single (dummy) proper policy, we
obtain that the total cost function under (µ∗, ν∗) is the unique solution of the dynamic programming
equation x = Tµ∗ν∗x. On the other hand, we have Tµ∗ν∗x
∗ = x∗ because x∗ = T˜ν∗x
∗ ≤ Tµ∗ν∗x∗ ≤
Tµ∗x
∗ = x∗ [cf. Eq. (2.4)]. Therefore, x∗ = x(µ∗, ν∗). Combining this with Eq. (2.6), we then have
that (µ∗, ν∗) is a pair of equilibrium (and optimal) policies for the two players and x∗ is the value
function of the game.
Next we consider value and policy iteration. Recall a well-known fact: if a monotone operator
H : ℜn → ℜn is nonexpansive with respect to the sup-norm (i.e., ‖Hx −Hy‖∞ ≤ ‖x − y‖∞) and
has a unique fixed point x¯, then fixed point iterations Hkx converge to x¯ for any initial x (see e.g.,
[YB13b, Lemma 2.1] for a proof). The monotone mapping T is nonexpansive with respect to the
sup-norm, and under Assumptions 2.1-2.3, it has a unique fixed point by Theorem 2.1. Therefore,
the iterates {xt} generated by value iteration, xt+1 = Txt, converge to x∗ for any initial x0 ∈ ℜn.
Policy iteration for each player starting with an essentially proper policy also converges under
Assumptions 2.1-2.3. This is shown below. Since our SSP game model is symmetric for the two
players, it suffices to discuss the case of player I. In policy iteration, starting from a policy µ0 ∈ D1
that is essentially proper, we define recursively xt ∈ ℜn and policy µt+1 ∈ D1 by
xt = Tµtxt, Tµt+1xt = Txt, t ≥ 0. (2.7)
By induction, in the above xt is well-defined (Lemma 2.1), µt+1 is well-defined under Assumption 2.1,
and since xt ≥ Tµt+1xt, all µt+1 thus generated are essentially proper (Lemma 2.3). It can also be
seen that {xt} is a non-increasing sequence (using the fact that Tµt+1xt ≤ xt). We summarize these
results in the theorem below.
Theorem 2.2 (Convergence of Value and Policy Iteration). Under Assumptions 2.1-2.3, with x∗
being the value function of the game, the following holds:
(i) Convergence of value iteration: For any x ∈ ℜn, limt→∞ T tx = x∗.
4More precisely, the argument for x(µ∗, pi2) ≤ x∗, pi2 ∈ Π2, is the following. For the total reward SSP problem
resulting from player I taking policy µ∗, consider the corresponding total cost problem with one-stage costs being
−ci(u¯, v¯). Then, by [BT91], −x∗ is the optimal total cost function, and hence, for every state i and pi2 ∈ Π2,
−x∗i ≤ lim inf
t→∞
Eµ∗pi2
[
−
t∑
k=0
cik (u¯k, v¯k) | i0 = i
]
= − lim sup
t→∞
Eµ∗pi2
[ t∑
k=0
cik (u¯k, v¯k) | i0 = i
]
≤ − lim inf
t→∞
Eµ∗pi2
[ t∑
k=0
cik (u¯k , v¯k) | i0 = i
]
= −xi(µ
∗, pi2),
which is x∗ ≥ x(µ∗, pi2).
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(ii) Convergence of policy iteration: Let {xt} and {µt} be defined by Eq. (2.7) with µ0 being
essentially proper for player I. Then all µt are essentially proper. Furthermore, limt→∞ xt =
x∗, and any cluster point µ∞ of {µt} is essentially proper and optimal for player I.
Proof. We prove the last statement in (ii); the other statements are already proved in the preceding
discussion. We have the relation
xt ≥ Txt = Tµt+1xt ≥ xt+1.
(To see this, note that since Tµtxt ≥ Txt [cf. Eq. (2.5)], we have xt ≥ Txt = Tµt+1xt. Using the
monotonicity of Tµt+1 , the fact that µt+1 is essentially proper, and Lemma 2.1, we then obtain
Tµt+1xt ≥ xt+1.) Hence the sequence {xt} is non-increasing. Since all µt are essentially proper, by
Lemma 2.2(ii), {xt} is bounded below by x˜ ∈ ℜn, the unique fixed point of T˜ν¯ , where ν¯ is any policy
of player II that is essentially proper. (By Lemma 2.3 such a policy ν¯ exists under Assumption 2.3.)
Therefore, {xt} converges to some x∞ ∈ ℜn. Using the relation xt ≥ Txt ≥ xt+1 and the continuity
of T , we obtain that x∞ ≥ Tx∞ ≥ x∞, i.e., x∞ = Tx∞. Since x∗ is the unique fixed point of T
(Theorem 2.1), we have x∞ = x
∗.
Let µ∞ be a cluster point of {µt}. Since every component of Tµx is a lower semicontinuous func-
tion of (µ, x) under Assumption 2.1, we obtain from the relation xt ≥ Tµt+1xt and the convergence
of {xt} to x∗ that x∗ ≥ Tµ∞x
∗. By Lemma 2.3(i), this implies that µ∞ is essentially proper. We
also have, by Eq. (2.5), that Tµ∞x
∗ ≥ Tx∗ = x∗. Hence Tµ∞x
∗ = Tx∗ and by Theorem 2.1, µ∞ is
an optimal policy for player I.
2.3 Further Remarks
The results we presented in this section bear close relations to those given in the earlier work [PB99]
on SSP games. In what follows we make a detailed comparison of our model assumption with
the formulation in [PB99], and we also discuss the scope and limitation of our model through a
well-known example.
Patek and Bertsekas [PB99] formulated an SSP game model and derived optimality results similar
to ours. The model conditions of [PB99, Assumption SSP] are stated in terms of deterministic
Markov policies π1, π2 (instead of stationary policies) of the two players:
(i) There exists a policy π1 of player I such that for all policies of player II, the termination state
is reached w.p.1 for all initial states.
(ii) For every pair of policies (π1, π2) that is prolonging, the expected total cost of player I is
infinite for at least one initial state i, i.e., xi(π1, π2) = +∞.
Instead of the essentially proper policies as we have defined, the well-behaved policies in their frame-
work, which they call proper policies, are the ones for player I under which the game terminates no
matter how player II plays. Under the above assumptions and continuity and regularity conditions,
they obtained optimality results similar to Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 for their model. Their results en-
sure that player I has an optimal stationary proper policy and policy iteration for player I converges
when starting from a proper policy. By contrast, our model formulation is centered on essentially
proper policies, under which the game need not terminate for all policies of the other player, and
our results ensure the existence of optimal stationary policies for both players within the class of
essentially proper policies, as well as the convergence of policy iteration starting with such a policy.
Let us discuss more about the above model assumptions (i)-(ii) considered by [PB99]. Because of
the non-stationarity of policy π1, it is not immediate to see what implication assumption (i) has on
the structure of the game. However, based on the results and analyses of [PB99], when assumption
(ii) and other continuity/regularity conditions are in force, assumption (i) is equivalent to:
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(i’) There exists a policy µ¯ ∈ D1 of player I such that for all ν ∈ D2 of player II, (µ¯, ν) is
non-prolonging.
Assumptions (i’) and (ii) clearly imply our Assumption 2.3, so our SSP game model covers a larger
class of games. Assumptions (i)-(ii) or (i’)-(ii) are also asymmetric for the two players, whereas
Assumption 2.3 has a symmetric form.
To see why Assumption 2.3 characterizes a much broader class of games than the model conditions
(i)-(ii) of [PB99] do, we note two main restrictions in the latter conditions. First, assumption (i)
overly favors player I by requiring that player I can terminate the game however player II plays,
whereas assumption (ii) overly favors player II by requiring that a non-terminating game is always to
the disadvantage of player I. Although these conditions seem natural for those applications in which
player I is a “pursuer” and player II an “evader,” and the game is over when the pursuer achieves
the goal of catching the evader (see [PB99, Sec. 5]), they are restrictive for games not of the pursuit-
evasion type. Second, by imposing the condition in assumption (ii) on every pair of prolonging
policies, assumptions (i)-(ii) effectively require that if the two players play only stationary policies,
then against any given strategy of player II, player I will not be able to obtain strictly negative
average cost (−∞ total cost), for any initial state. Consider the implication of this for a finite state
and control game, for example. (In a finite state and control game, U¯(i) and V¯ (i) correspond to
the distributions over the finite control sets at state i under randomized stationary policies, and π1
and π2 correspond to randomized Markov policies.) Then the requirement imposed by assumptions
(i)-(ii) just mentioned entails that against any given deterministic stationary policy of player II,
player I cannot find a stationary policy to obtain an infinite amount of return by prolonging the
game. This is a serious restriction in the model formulation of [PB99].
To end this section, we discuss some examples of total cost zero-sum games that are excluded by
our model assumptions. The following simple finite state and control game, due to Everett [Eve57],
has no optimal policy for player II but has a value [KS81]. The state space is So = {0, 1}. At state
1, there are two controls {1, 2} for each player, and when player I applies control u and player II
control v, the system transitions to state 0 with cost 1 if u = v, transitions to state 0 with cost 0 if
u = 1, v = 2, and transitions to state 1 with cost 0 if u = 2, v = 1. (Here U¯(1), V¯ (1) are given by
the set of probability distributions on {1, 2}.) The value of the game for state 1 is 1. This example
violates Assumption 2.3(iii) because the pair of policies with player I applying control 2 and player
II control 1 at state 1, is prolonging but incurs zero total cost.
It is worth to mention that in this example, although not every player has an optimal policy,
the dynamic programming equation x = Tx of the game does have a unique solution, which is
the value of the game [KS81]. It is also easy to construct examples where the game has a value,
both players have stationary optimal policies, and the dynamic programming equation has a unique
solution, but there exists a prolonging pair of stationary optimal policies (with zero average cost)
so that the game will be excluded by our model assumption. Here is the simplest such example: let
the state and control spaces be as in the preceding example; let all one-stage costs be zero; and at
state 1, let the system transit to state 0 if either player applies control 1, and let the system stay
at state 1 otherwise. In this game, all policies are optimal, the value of the game is zero, and it is
the unique solution of the dynamic programming equation. This illustrates that not all games with
nice optimality properties are included in the class of games satisfying our model assumptions.
3 Q-Learning for Finite-Space SSP Games
Starting with this section, we will focus on total cost zero-sum games with a finite state and control
space and analyze the convergence of a model-free, stochastic approximation-based algorithm, Q-
learning, for solving these games. In this section, first, the SSP game model introduced in Section 2
will be specialized to the finite-space game context, to provide a finite-space SSP game model that
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has desirable optimality properties for applying the Q-learning algorithm. The Q-learning algorithm
will then be introduced, along with the convergence results we have obtained. The major proofs for
these results will be given in the next section.
3.1 Finite-Space SSP Games
Consider a finite state and control two-player zero-sum game. The state space is So = S ∪ {0} as
before, where 0 is the cost-free termination state. At state i ∈ S, each player has a finite set of
feasible controls, denoted by U(i), V (i) for player I, player II, respectively. The rules of the game
and the objectives of the two players are as described in Section 2.1. However, with apologies to
the readers, we will use some different notation to make it conforming to standard notation in the
Q-learning literature. In particular, for each pair of controls (u, v) ∈ U(i) × V (i), let pij(u, v) be
the probability of transition from state i to j ∈ So, let gˆ(i, u, v, j) be the corresponding transition
cost,5 and let g(i, u, v) =
∑
j∈S pij(u, v)gˆ(i, u, v, j) denote the expected one-stage cost at state i with
controls (u, v). At each time t, every player may use the information of the current state it and the
history of the game, including the past states {ik, k < t} and past controls {uk, vk, k < t} of both
players, to decide which control to apply. When player I adopts policy π1 and player II π2, we write
the total cost of player I starting from initial state i as J(i;π1, π2), i.e.,
J(i;π1, π2) = lim inf
t→∞
Eπ1π2
[ t∑
k=0
gˆ(ik, uk, vk, ik+1)
∣∣ i0 = i ].
(Since we will deal with asynchronous iterative algorithms in this section, we find the notation
J(i;π1, π2) more convenient than the notation xi(π1, π2) of Section 2, thus reserving subscripts for
iteration indices.) As before, for every state i, the two players’ goals are:
player I: minimize
π1∈Π1
sup
π2∈Π2
J(i;π1, π2), player II: maximize
π2∈Π2
inf
π1∈Π1
J(i;π1, π2).
Of particular importance are stationary randomized policies. For each state i ∈ S, let U¯(i) =
P
(
U(i)
)
and V¯ (i) = P
(
V (i)
)
denote the set of probability distributions on U(i) and V (i), respec-
tively, which are the randomized decision rules of the two players for state i. A stationary randomized
policy of a player takes the form,
for player I: µ = {µ(· | i) | i ∈ S}, where µ(· | i) ∈ U¯(i),
for player II: ν = {ν(· | i) | i ∈ S}, where ν(· | i) ∈ V¯ (i).
With such a policy µ (ν, resp.), at state i, player I (player II, resp.) takes control u (v, resp.) with
probability µ(u | i) (ν(v | i), resp.). We denote the set of stationary randomized policies of player I
and player II by Π1,SR and Π2,SR, respectively.
We can relate the above finite-space game to a finite-state compact-control game considered
in Section 2, where the compact control sets correspond to the sets of randomized decision rules
of each player in the present context. In particular, in the framework of Section 2, consider the
corresponding compact-control game where:
(a) The compact control sets at state i for the two players are given by the sets U¯(i), V¯ (i)
defined above. For a pair (ρ, σ) ∈ U¯(i) × V¯ (i), the probability of transition to state j is
given by
∑
u∈U(i)
∑
v∈V (i) ρ(u)σ(v)pij(u, v), whereas the expected one-stage cost is given by∑
u∈U(i)
∑
v∈V (i) ρ(u)σ(v)g(i, u, v). These transition probabilities and one-stage costs satisfy
the continuity/semi-continuity conditions in Assumption 2.1.
5More generally, the transition cost can also depend on some additional stochastic disturbance ω and take the form
gˆ(i, u, v, j, ω). Our analysis of Q-learning applies to such type of random transition costs provided that they have
bounded variance, but for notational simplicity, we do not introduce them in the paper.
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(b) The sets D1 and D2 of stationary deterministic policies in the notation of Section 2 correspond
to the sets Π1,SR and Π2,SR of stationary randomized policies of player I and player II defined
above, respectively.
(c) With the correspondences in (a)-(b), the regularity condition in Assumption 2.2 is satisfied,
and the dynamic programming equation, which we write as J = TJ here, is given by
J(i) = (TJ)(i) := inf
ρ∈U¯(i)
sup
σ∈V¯ (i)
∑
u∈U(i)
∑
v∈V (i)
ρ(u)σ(v)
(
g(i, u, v) +
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v)J(j)
)
, ∀ i ∈ S.
(3.1)
The dynamic programming operator T˜ is given by exchanging the order of inf and sup in
the above expression defining T . The dynamic programming operators Tµ, T˜ν for policies
µ ∈ Π1,SR and ν ∈ Π2,SR are given by
(TµJ)(i) := sup
σ∈V¯ (i)
∑
u∈U(i)
∑
v∈V (i)
µ(u | i)σ(v)
(
g(i, u, v) +
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v)J(j)
)
, ∀ i ∈ S,
(TνJ)(i) := inf
ρ∈U¯(i)
∑
u∈U(i)
∑
v∈V (i)
ρ(u) ν(v | i)
(
g(i, u, v) +
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v)J(j)
)
, ∀ i ∈ S.
The SSP game model given in Assumption 2.3 then translates to the following model condition
on finite-space games:
Assumption 3.1 (Finite-Space SSP Game Model). Assumption 2.3 holds for D1 = Π1,SR and
D2 = Π2,SR. That is, (i) player I (player II) has a stationary randomized policy under which the
player’s total cost (reward) is less than +∞ (greater than −∞) no matter what stationary randomized
policy the other player takes; and (ii) under any prolonging pair of stationary randomized policies
of the two players, there is some initial state for which either the total cost for player I is +∞ or
the total reward for player II is −∞.
Under Assumption 3.1, Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 apply to finite-space games through their associated
compact-control games just described. In particular, we obtain from Theorem 2.1:6
Proposition 3.1 (Optimality Properties of Finite-Space SSP Games). For a finite-space SSP game
satisfying Assumption 3.1, there exist equilibrium policies (µ∗, ν∗) ∈ Π1,SR×Π2,SR for the two players,
i.e.,
J(i;µ∗, π2) ≤ J(i;µ
∗, ν∗) ≤ J(i;π1, ν
∗), ∀π1 ∈ Π1, π2 ∈ Π2, i ∈ S. (3.2)
6In translating Theorem 2.1 into Proposition 3.1, there is a small technical detail that we need to mention: the
policy spaces Π1,Π2 in the finite-space game are not the policy spaces in the corresponding compact-control game.
Let us denote the latter sets by Π¯1, Π¯2 for the two players respectively. In general a history-dependent policy in Π¯1
or Π¯2 does not necessarily lie in Π1 or Π2. This is because the player in the finite-space game does not observe the
randomized decision rules that the other player took in the past, and therefore cannot make control decisions based on
that information, whereas the player in the corresponding compact-control game can use that information for control.
However, Markov policies, in particular stationary policies, for either game are also policies for the other game. We
use this fact together with a standard Markovian property in MDP to obtain the desired results for the finite-space
game. For example, we can prove Eq. (3.2) as follows. By a direct application of Theorem 2.1 to the compact-control
game, there exist (µ∗, ν∗) ∈ Π1,SR ×Π2,SR with
J(i;µ∗, p¯i2) ≤ J(i;µ
∗, ν∗) ≤ J(i; p¯i1, ν
∗), ∀ p¯i1 ∈ Π¯1, p¯i2 ∈ Π¯2, i ∈ S.
To obtain Eq. (3.2) from this inequality, consider first the total cost J(i;pi1, ν∗) for any given state i and policy
pi1 ∈ Π1 in the finite-space game. Because the state evolves in a Markovian way when player II plays the stationary
policy ν∗, one can construct a randomized Markov policy p˜i1 such that J(i; p˜i1, ν∗) = J(i;pi1, ν∗) (such construction
is well-known in the MDP theory). Since a randomized Markov policy of player I lies in the intersection Π1 ∩ Π¯1,
we have J(i;µ∗, ν∗) ≤ J(i; p˜i1, ν∗) by the preceding inequality, and consequently, J(i;µ∗, ν∗) ≤ J(i; pi1, ν∗) for any
pi1 ∈ Π1 and i ∈ S. This proves the second half of the desired inequality (3.2). The other half of (3.2) follows from
the same argument applied to player II.
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The value function of the game, given by J∗(·) = J(·;µ∗, ν∗), is the unique solution of the dynamic
programming equation J = TJ given by (3.1). Moreover, any µ∗ ∈ Π1,SR, ν∗ ∈ Π2,SR such that
Tµ∗J
∗ = TJ∗, T˜ ∗ν J
∗ = TJ∗ are optimal policies of player I and player II, respectively, and they are
essentially proper, with the pair (µ∗, ν∗) forming a non-prolonging pair of equilibrium policies.
Remark 3.1. In a sequential game, only one player can move at each time and whose turn to move
depends on the current state (see e.g., [BT96, Section 7.2]). Equivalently, at each state, one of the
two players has a singleton control set. Then, from the definition of T and T˜ [cf. Eq. (3.1)] it follows
that for a sequential SSP game satisfying Assumption 3.1, both players have stationary deterministic
equilibriums policies. It also follows that for sequential games, we may replace the sets Π1,SR and
Π2,SR in Assumption 3.1 and Proposition 3.1 by the sets of stationary deterministic policies of the
two players.
From Theorem 2.2 we obtain convergence of value and policy iteration for the finite-space game
under Assumption 3.1. We will not focus on these algorithms in the rest of this paper, however.
Instead, we will focus on a model-free algorithm called Q-learning, for computing the value function
of the game. The algorithm is useful when the transition probabilities and expected one-stage
costs are unknown or when the model is too complicated to have these parameters written down
explicitly, but random transitions and transition costs can be observed or generated by a simulator.
The Q-learning algorithm may be viewed as a stochastic value iteration algorithm. Standard value
iteration, however, computes TJ for some vector J at each iteration. It would be difficult to do so
in the model-free context, with only a few observations of state transitions, as can be seen from the
expression of TJ in Eq. (3.1). The Q-learning algorithm will work not with the cost vector J but
with the so-called Q-factors and an associated dynamic programming equation, which is equivalent
to the dynamic equation J = TJ by a change of variable (from J to Q-factors). To prepare for the
study of the Q-learning algorithm, let us explain this equation now.
Q-Factors and the Associated Dynamic Programming Equation
Let R =
{
(i, u, v) | i ∈ S, u ∈ U(i), v ∈ V (i)
}
be the state-and-control space. In the dynamic
programming equation (3.1), which we repeat here:
J(i) = (TJ)(i) = inf
ρ∈U¯(i)
sup
σ∈V¯ (i)
∑
u∈U(i)
∑
v∈V (i)
ρ(u)σ(v)
(
g(i, u, v) +
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v)J(j)
)
, ∀ i ∈ S,
let us make a change of variable from J to Q =
{
Q(i, u, v) | (i, u, v) ∈ R
}
by letting
Q(i, u, v) = g(i, u, v) +
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v)J(j), (i, u, v) ∈ R.
This gives an equation in terms Q: for all (i, u, v) ∈ R,
Q(i, u, v) = g(i, u, v) +
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v)(TJ)(j)
= g(i, u, v) +
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v) inf
ρ∈U¯(j)
sup
σ∈V¯ (j)
∑
u′∈U(j)
∑
v′∈V (j)
ρ(u′)σ(v′)Q(j, u′, v′). (3.3)
To simplify notation, we define the shorthand notation
Q(i, ρ, σ) =
∑
u∈U(i)
∑
v∈V (i)
ρ(u)σ(v)Q(i, u, v) (3.4)
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for a given vector Q and randomized decision rules ρ ∈ U¯(i), σ ∈ V¯ (i) for a state i. Then Eq. (3.3)
can be expressed concisely as
Q = FQ or Q(i, u, v) = (FQ)(i, u, v), ∀ (i, u, v) ∈ R, (3.5)
where the operator F : ℜ|R| → ℜ|R| is given by
(FQ)(i, u, v) := g(i, u, v) +
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v) inf
ρ∈U¯(j)
sup
σ∈V¯ (j)
Q(j, ρ, σ), (i, u, v) ∈ R. (3.6)
We refer to the components of Q as Q-factors. Equation Q = FQ given by (3.5) is the dynamic
programming equation for Q-factors. Since it is obtained from J = TJ by a change of a variable,
any solution of J = TJ gives us a solution of Q = FQ. Conversely, if in the equation Q = FQ we
change the variable Q to J by letting
J(i) = inf
ρ∈U¯(i)
sup
σ∈V¯ (i)
Q(i, ρ, σ), ∀ i ∈ S,
then by a direct calculation, we get back the equation J = TJ . Hence any solution of Q = FQ gives
us a solution of J = TJ . Furthermore, it can be verified using the definition of F and T that there
is a one-to-one correspondence between the solutions of these two dynamic programming equations.
Using these facts, some optimality properties given in Prop. 3.1 can be stated in terms of Q-factors
as follows:
Corollary 3.1 (Optimality Properties of Finite-Space SSP Games in terms of Q-factors). For a
finite-space SSP game satisfying Assumption 3.1, the dynamic programming equation (3.5) has a
unique solution Q∗, which relates to the value function J∗ of the game by
Q∗(i, u, v) = g(i, u, v) +
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v)J
∗(j), ∀ (i, u, v) ∈ R,
J∗(i) = inf
ρ∈U¯(i)
sup
σ∈V¯ (i)
Q∗(i, ρ, σ), ∀ i ∈ S.
Any stationary policies µ∗ ∈ Π1,SR, ν∗ ∈ Π2,SR such that for every state i,
µ∗(· | i) ∈ argmin
ρ∈U¯(i)
sup
σ∈V¯ (i)
Q∗(i, ρ, σ), ν∗(· | i) ∈ argmax
σ∈V¯ (i)
inf
ρ∈U¯(i)
Q∗(i, ρ, σ),
are optimal policies for the two players.
As Cor. 3.1 shows, for an SSP game satisfying Assumption 3.1, if we know Q∗, we can use it to
compute the value function of the game and optimal policies of the two players, by solving for each
state a matrix game defined by Q∗: minimaxρ∈U¯(i),σ∈V¯ (i)Q
∗(i, ρ, σ). These matrix game problems
do not involve the parameters of the SSP game, which can be unknown in the learning context.
Corollary 3.1 also shows that under Assumption 3.1, Q∗ is the unique fixed point of the dynamic
programming operator F , and therefore, since F is also monotone and nonexpansive with respect
to the sup-norm ‖ · ‖∞ by definition, the fixed point iteration Qt+1 = FQt converges to Q
∗ for any
initial Q0. These properties are important for applying the Q-learning algorithm to compute Q
∗.
3.2 Q-Learning for SSP Games
The Q-learning algorithm is an asynchronous stochastic iterative algorithm, and as mentioned ear-
lier, it does not require the knowledge of the model parameters such as transition probabilities
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and expected one-stage costs. Instead, its computation is based on random state transitions and
transition costs, which may be generated by a simulator or observed in a real learning environment.
We consider using Q-learning to compute the function Q∗ for a finite-space SSP game satisfying
Assumption 3.1. Intuitively, one may view the algorithm as a stochastic version of damped fixed
point iterations with the mapping F , i.e., iterations of the form (1 − γ)Q+ γFQ for some stepsize
parameter γ.7 The algorithm generates iteratively a sequence of Q-factor vectors, {Qt}. Our main
result is a proof that this sequence converges to Q∗ w.p.1 in a fairly general totally asynchronous
computation setting.
To describe the algorithm, first recall that
(FQ)(i, u, v) = g(i, u, v) +
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v) inf
ρ∈U¯(j)
sup
σ∈V¯ (j)
Q(j, ρ, σ)
[cf. Eqs. (3.6), (3.4)], so a damped fixed point iteration Qt+1 = (1 − γ)Qt + γFQt will set the
(i, u, v)-th component of Qt+1 to be
Qt+1(i, u, v) = (1− γ)Qt(i, u, v) + γ
(
g(i, u, v) +
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v) inf
ρ∈U¯(j)
sup
σ∈V¯ (j)
Q
t
(j, ρ, σ)
)
.
The Q-learning algorithm we describe next differs from the above iteration in several ways:
(i) It is an asynchronous algorithm. At each iteration, it updates only a chosen subset of Q-factor
components, keeping the rest unchanged.
(ii) Its computation can be distributed among multiple processors. Each Q-factor component can
be updated by a separate processor, for example, and communication delays are taken into
account by allowing a processor to use outdated information in computation. In particular,
for updating the (i, u, v)-th component at iteration t, the algorithm can use the Q-factor
component Qτ (j, u˜, v˜) computed at some iteration τ ≤ t, where τ can depend on both (i, u, v)
and (j, u˜, v˜), reflecting the communication delay between the two associated processors. In
the algorithm, we will write these τ variables as τℓℓ˜(t), for every pair of state-control triplets
ℓ = (i, u, v), ℓ˜ = (j, u˜, v˜) ∈ R. For each ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R, we will use the shorthand notation
Q
(ℓ)
t to denote the Q-factor vector whose (j, u˜, v˜)-th component is given by:
Q
(ℓ)
t (j, u˜, v˜) = Qτℓℓ˜(t)(j, u˜, v˜) with ℓ˜ = (j, u˜, v˜) ∈ R. (3.7)
For ℓ = (i, u, v), we can view Q
(ℓ)
t as the “local information” that the ℓth processor uses for
updating Qt+1(i, u, v).
(iii) It is a model-free, stochastic approximation-based algorithm. Compared with the damped
fixed point iteration Qt+1(i, u, v) = (1 − γ)Qt(i, u, v) + γ(FQ
(ℓ)
t )(i, u, v) using possibly “out-
dated” information as just discussed, the Q-learning iterate for Qt+1(i, u, v) uses, in place
of (FQ
(ℓ)
t )(i, u, v), an unbiased estimate of (FQ
(ℓ)
t )(i, u, v) obtained through sampling state
transitions randomly.
Let us describe now the Q-learning algorithm. The algorithm generates recursively a sequence
{Qt} of Q-factor vectors. At each iteration, it generates random state transitions, and the ter-
mination state 0 and the zero total cost at that state appear explicitly in the calculation. For
notational convenience, let us define for state 0, the dummy control sets U(0) = V (0) = {0} with
7The behavior of the Q-learning algorithm in practice is, however, much more complex than suggested by this simple
view (in the context of MDP, its behavior can sometimes resemble policy iteration, for example). Such complexity can
be attributed in part to various coordination schemes one can use with asynchronous and distributed computation.
This subject is beyond the scope of this paper, however.
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U¯(0) = V¯ (0) = P({0}), and treat Q-factors as (|R| + 1)-dimensional vectors with Q(0, 0, 0) = 0. It
will be taken for granted that Qt(0, 0, 0) = 0 for all t and the variables τℓℓ˜(ℓ˜) for communications
delays between ℓ ∈ R and ℓ˜ = (0, 0, 0) are (arbitrarily) defined. Given {Qτ , τ ≤ t}, the tth iteration
of the algorithm computes Qt+1 as follows.
Q-Learning Algorithm (tth iteration)
For each state-control triplet ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R:
(a) Let γt,ℓ ∈ [0, 1] be a stepsize parameter. For each ℓ˜ ∈ R, let τℓℓ˜(t) ≤ t be a nonnegative integer.
(b) Generate a random transition from state i with control (u, v), and denote the successor state
by jℓt (here j
ℓ
t ∈ So). With s being a shorthand for the state j
ℓ
t , let
Qt+1(i, u, v) = (1− γt,ℓ)Qt(i, u, v) + γt,ℓ
(
gˆ(i, u, v, s) + inf
ρ∈U¯(s)
sup
σ∈V¯ (s)
Q(ℓ)
t
(s, ρ, σ)
)
. (3.8)
Here for s 6= 0 (i.e., s is not the termination state), Q(ℓ)
t
(s, ρ, σ) is a shorthand notation for
the weighted average of Q-factors,∑
u˜∈U(s)
∑
v˜∈V (s)
ρ(u˜)σ(v˜)Q
(ℓ)
t (s, u˜, v˜),
with Q
(ℓ)
t being the Q-factor vector given by Eq. (3.7). For s = 0, Q
(ℓ)
t
(s, ρ, σ) = 0 [which
is also consistent with the preceding expression when we extend the definition in Eq. (3.7) to
include ℓ˜ = (0, 0, 0)].
We note that the stepsize variables specify implicitly the subset of Q-factor components to be
updated at iteration t. If γt,ℓ = 0, then Qt+1(ℓ) = Qt(ℓ) and no computation is actually needed to
carry out step (b). The components with positive stepsizes, {ℓ ∈ R | γt,ℓ > 0}, are those for which
the corresponding Q-factors are selected for an update.
The variables appearing in the Q-learning algorithm will be regarded as random variables on a
common probability space (Ω,F ,P). We require them to satisfy the following standard conditions
for asynchronous Q-learning (cf. [Tsi94]). (In fact, without these conditions, the algorithm as just
described is imprecise.) Let {Ft} be an increasing sequence of sub-σ-fields of F . (They represent
the histories of the algorithm up to certain times.)
Assumption 3.2 (Algorithmic Conditions).
(i) Q0 is F0-measurable.
(ii) For every ℓ, ℓ˜ ∈ R and t ≥ 0, γt,ℓ and τℓℓ˜(t) are Ft-measurable.
(iii) For every ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R and t ≥ 0, jℓt is Ft+1-measurable and
P(jℓt = j | Ft) = pij(u, v), j ∈ So. (3.9)
(iv) With probability 1,
lim
t→∞
τℓℓ˜(t) =∞, ∀ ℓ, ℓ˜ ∈ R. (3.10)
(v) With probability 1, ∑
t≥0
γt,ℓ =∞,
∑
t≥0
γ2t,ℓ <∞, ∀ ℓ ∈ R. (3.11)
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Conditions (i)-(iii) are on the probabilistic dependence relations between the variables. They
are naturally satisfied by the Q-learning algorithm in practice, when at each iteration, the values
of stepsizes and communication delays are chosen before the random successor states are gener-
ated. Condition (iv) is on the variables related to communication delays: it ensures that outdated
information will eventually be purged by the algorithm, so it is a minimal requirement for totally
asynchronous computation. Condition (v) is a standard stepsize condition. It implies that every
Q-factor component is updated infinitely often, which is certainly indispensable for the Q-learning
algorithm to find Q∗ in the limit.
We have the following results regarding the convergence of the Q-learning algorithm given above.
Theorem 3.1 (Boundedness of Q-Learning Iterates). Consider a finite-space SSP game satisfying
Assumption 3.1. Then under Assumption 3.2(i)-(iii) and (v), for any given initial Q0, the sequence
{Qt} generated by the Q-learning algorithm (3.8) is bounded w.p.1.
Theorem 3.2 (Convergence of Q-Learning). Consider a finite-space SSP game satisfying Assump-
tion 3.1. Then under Assumption 3.2, for any given initial Q0, the sequence {Qt} generated by the
Q-learning algorithm (3.8) converges w.p.1 to the unique solution Q∗ of the equation Q = FQ.
Theorem 3.1 on the boundedness of {Qt} is our main result. Its proof will be the subject of the
next section. Assuming it has been proved, the convergence of Q-learning stated in Theorem 3.2
follows by combining the boundedness result with a convergence theorem of Tsitsiklis [Tsi94]. We
give this proof below.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. To analyze the convergence of the Q-learning iterates Qt, we write them in
a form that is standard for stochastic approximation-based analysis. For every ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R and
every t ≥ 0, we express the iteration (3.8) equivalently as
Qt+1(i, u, v) = (1− γt,ℓ)Qt(i, u, v) + γt,ℓ
(
FQ
(ℓ)
t
)
(i, u, v) + γt,ℓwt,ℓ, (3.12)
where wt,ℓ is a noise term given by
wt,ℓ = gˆ(i, u, v, s) + inf
ρ∈U¯(s)
sup
σ∈V¯ (s)
Q(ℓ)
t
(s, ρ, σ)−
(
FQ
(ℓ)
t
)
(i, u, v),
and s is a shorthand notation for the random successor state jℓt . Using Eq. (3.9) and the definition
of the mapping F [cf. Eq. (3.6)], direct calculation shows that the noise terms in the iteration (3.12)
satisfy that for every ℓ ∈ R and t ≥ 0,
E
[
wt,ℓ | Ft
]
= 0, w.p.1,
and there exist deterministic constants A and B, independent of ℓ and t, such that
E
[
w2t,ℓ | Ft
]
≤ A+Bmax
ℓ′∈R
max
τ≤t
|Qτ (ℓ
′)|2, w.p.1.
Then, since under Assumption 3.1, F has a unique fixed point Q∗ and is monotone and nonexpansive
with respect to ‖ · ‖∞, a convergence theorem of Tsitsiklis [Tsi94, Theorem 2] applies and shows
that {Qt} converges to Q∗ w.p.1, provided that {Qt} is bounded w.p.1. The desired convergence
result then follows from Theorem 3.1.
Remark 3.2. We have set the stepsizes γt,ℓ ≤ 1 in this paper. Theorems 3.1, 3.2 actually hold
without this restriction, but in order to handle the general case of positive, possibly unbounded
stepsizes, additional technical arguments are needed in the proofs, and such arguments can be found
in the papers [YB13a, YB13b]. To avoid the technical complication and repetition, in this paper we
choose not to focus on general stepsizes.
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Remark 3.3. As mentioned in the introduction section, using the O.D.E.-based analysis, Abounadi,
Bertsekas and Borkar [ABB02] established convergence for a class of asynchronous stochastic ap-
proximation algorithms involving nonexpansive mappings, and their results can be applied to the
Q-learning algorithm for SSP games we consider. However, their asynchronous computation frame-
work differs from the totally asynchronous computation framework we consider here. A chief as-
sumption in their framework is that all the components are updated comparatively often in the sense
that lim inft→∞m(t, ℓ)/t > 0 for all components ℓ, where m(t, ℓ) is the number of times the ℓ-th
component has been updated up to time t. (See also the related asynchronous schemes and their
analyses in [Bor98, BM00], [Bor08, Chap. 7].) If this and some other conditions on the stepsizes
and communication delays are assumed to hold, the convergence result of [ABB02] when applied in
our context would lead to the conclusion that Qt tracks the scaled O.D.E. Q˙ =
1
|R|(FQ − Q). By
comparison, the totally asynchronous Q-learning algorithm considered here is generally not to be
expected to have such kind of behavior, since it does not restrict how often a component should be
selected for update. Correspondingly, the boundedness and convergence analyses of the algorithm
for the totally asynchronous case also differ significantly from the O.D.E.-based analyses in the
aforementioned works.
4 Boundedness of Q-Learning Iterates
In this section we prove Theorem 3.1 on the boundedness of Q-learning iterates for a finite-space
SSP game satisfying Assumption 3.1. The proof is long and uses a line of analysis devised earlier for
bounding Q-learning iterates in single-player SSP problems (Yu and Bertsekas [YB13a]). After the
proof of Theorem 3.1, which takes up Section 4.1, we include in Section 4.2 a short boundedness proof
for a special case where the assumption on the game model is more restrictive than Assumption 3.1
and the boundedness analysis is based on a contraction argument.
4.1 Boundedness Analysis for the General Case
In this subsection, we prove the boundedness of Q-learning iterates stated in Theorem 3.1. Assump-
tion 3.1 implies that there exist a policy µ¯ ∈ Π1,SR of player I and a policy ν¯ ∈ Π2,SR of player II
that are essentially proper (Lemma 2.3). We will prove the lower boundedness of {Qt} by using
the essential properness property of the policy ν¯ and by using the implications of this property on
the single-player SSP problem for player I when player II plays the policy ν¯. Due to symmetry, the
same proof will also establish that {Qt} is bounded above w.p.1, by applying an identical argument
to {−Qt} and using the essential properness property of the policy µ¯.
The proof consists of several steps, given in separate subsections. The main idea of the proof,
reflected in the titles of these subsections, can be outlined as follows:
1. We relate {Qt} to a sequence {Qˆt} of iterates that resembles Q-learning in the single-player
SSP problem associated with the policy ν¯. We show that lower boundedness of {Qˆt} implies
lower boundedness of {Qt}. (See Section 4.1.1.)
2. For any given positive scalar δ, we construct an auxiliary sequence {Q˜t} such that (i) it is
lower bounded w.p.1 if and only if {Qˆt} is lower bounded w.p.1, and (ii) each component of
Q˜t can be interpreted as the total cost of some policy in a time-inhomogeneous SSP problem
in the “δ-neighborhood” of the single-player SSP problem associated with the policy ν¯. (See
Sections 4.1.2-4.1.5.) These are the key steps of our proof.
3. We show that when δ is sufficiently small, the optimal total costs of all the single-player SSP
problems in the aforementioned “δ-neighborhood” can be bounded uniformly from below, and
hence the auxiliary sequence {Q˜t} is bounded below w.p.1. (See Section 4.1.6.) This leads to
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the desired conclusion that {Qˆt} and hence {Qt} are bounded below w.p.1, completing the
proof.
The auxiliary sequence-based arguments we use in this proof are first used in the boundedness
analysis of Q-learning for single-player SSP problems [YB13a].
4.1.1 Relate {Qt} to Q-learning type iterations in a single-player SSP problem
To facilitate the analysis, we first reduce the question of lower boundedness of {Qt} to the question
of lower boundedness of another process {Qˆt}, which is defined on the same probability space as
{Qt}. The advantage of working with {Qˆt} is that we can relate it to Q-learning like iterations for
a single-player SSP that satisfies the SSP Model Assumption.
Let ν¯ ∈ Π2,SR be an essentially proper policy of player II; the existence of such a policy is ensured
by Lemma 2.3 under Assumption 3.1. To simplify notation, denote ν¯i = ν¯(· | i) for every i ∈ So
[note ν¯i ∈ P(V (i))]. We define an iteration similar to the Q-learning iteration (3.8), using the same
random variables (i.e., γt,ℓ, j
ℓ
t and τℓℓ˜(t), ℓ, ℓ˜ ∈ R) that appear in the Q-learning iteration (3.8). In
particular, let Qˆ0 = Q0 and for t ≥ 0 and for every ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R, let
Qˆt+1(i, u, v) = (1 − γt,ℓ)Qˆt(i, u, v) + γt,ℓ
(
gˆ(i, u, v, s) + inf
ρ∈U¯(s)
Qˆ
(ℓ)
t
(s, ρ, ν¯s)
)
, (4.1)
where s is a shorthand for the successor state jℓt , and the expression Qˆ
(ℓ)
t
(s, ρ, ν¯s) denotes a weighted
average of Q-factors given by
Qˆ
(ℓ)
t
(s, ρ, ν¯s) =
∑
u˜∈U(s)
∑
v˜∈V (s)
ρ(u˜)ν¯s(v˜)Qˆ
(ℓ)
t (s, u˜, v˜)
with Qˆ
(ℓ)
t being the vector whose ℓ˜th component for ℓ˜ ∈ R∪{(0, 0, 0)} is given by Qˆ
(ℓ)
t (ℓ˜) = Qˆτℓℓ˜(t)(ℓ˜),
similar to the definition ofQ
(ℓ)
t given by Eq. (3.7). (By default Qˆτ (0, 0, 0) = 0 for all τ .) The iteration
(4.1) differs from the Q-learning iteration (3.8) in that instead of maximizing over σ ∈ V¯ (s), we fix
σ at ν¯s.
Lemma 4.1. If {Qˆt} is bounded below w.p.1, so is {Qt}.
Proof. We show by induction that Qt ≥ Qˆt for all t. For t = 0, this holds since Qˆ0 = Q0 by
definition. Suppose that for some t ≥ 0, the desired relation holds for all τ ≤ t. Then, for every
ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R, using Eqs. (3.8), (4.1), the induction hypothesis, and the fact that γt,ℓ ∈ [0, 1], we
have that
Qt+1(i, u, v) ≥ (1− γt,ℓ)Qt(i, u, v) + γt,ℓ
(
gˆ(i, u, v, s) + inf
ρ∈U¯(s)
Q(ℓ)
t
(s, ρ, ν¯s)
)
≥ (1− γt,ℓ)Qˆt(i, u, v) + γt,ℓ
(
gˆ(i, u, v, s) + inf
ρ∈U¯(s)
Qˆ
(ℓ)
t
(s, ρ, ν¯s)
)
= Qˆt+1(i, u, v),
where s is a shorthand for the successor state jℓt . This completes the induction and establishes that
Qt ≥ Qˆt for all t. Hence {Qt} is bounded below w.p.1 if {Qˆt} is so.
By the preceding lemma, in order to establish the lower boundedness of the Q-learning iterates
{Qt}, it is sufficient to prove that the sequence {Qˆt} defined above is bounded below w.p.1. The
iterates {Qˆt} are similar to Q-learning iterates in an MDP. Our goal now is to make this connection
more precise so that we can apply the results or proof techniques developed for analyzing Q-learning
in single-player problems to bound {Qˆt} from below. To this end, let us examine the single-player
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problem faced by player I when player II plays the essentially proper policy ν¯. We will call this
single-player SSP problem SSP(ν¯). For later use, we will augment its state space to include the set
R also. Here is the precise definition of SSP(ν¯).
Definition 4.1. SSP(ν¯) denotes the following single-player SSP problem:
(1) The state space is So ∪R, with state 0 being a cost-free termination state.
(2) From a state ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R, the system transitions to a state j ∈ So. The transition is
uncontrolled and occurs with probability pij(u, v), and the expected one-stage cost is g(i, u, v).
(3) For a state i ∈ S, the control set is U(i), and for each u ∈ U(i), the system transitions to a
state j ∈ So with probability
pν¯,ij(u) =
∑
v∈V (i)
ν¯(v | i) pij(u, v), (4.2)
and the expected one-stage cost is
gν¯(i, u) =
∑
v∈V (i)
ν¯(v | i) g(i, u, v). (4.3)
Because ν¯ is an essentially proper policy of the SSP game (cf. Definition 2.3), we can show that
the single-player problem SSP(ν¯) satisfies the single-player SSP Model Assumption (cf. the discussion
preceding Definition 2.3). Let ΠSD (ΠSR) denote the set of stationary deterministic (randomized)
policies in SSP(ν¯).
Lemma 4.2. SSP(ν¯) satisfies the SSP Model Assumption; that is, there exists a proper policy in
ΠSD, and every improper policy in ΠSD incurs infinite cost for at least one initial state. (Here proper
and improper policies are as defined in Definition 2.2 for a single-player SSP problem.)
Proof. The system dynamics of SSP(ν¯) described in Definition 4.1(2)-(3) shows that to prove the
lemma, it suffices to consider only those states in So and prove that SSP(ν¯) restricted to So satisfies
the SSP model Assumption. Let us simply call this restricted problem SSP(ν¯) in the proof below.
Since ν¯ is an essentially proper policy of a finite-space SSP game that satisfies Assumption 3.1, by
Definition 2.3(b), SSP(ν¯) has the following properties: there exists a proper policy in ΠSR, and every
improper policy in ΠSR incurs infinite cost for at least one initial state. Hence, to prove the lemma,
we need to show that SSP(ν¯) has a proper policy in ΠSD.
We claim that if there exists a proper policy in ΠSR, then there must exist a proper policy in ΠSD.
This follows from the relation between the limiting average state-action frequency of a stationary
randomized policy and the set of the limiting average state-action frequencies of all stationary
deterministic policies, in a finite-space MDP. (For the definition of these limiting frequencies, see
[Put94, Section 8.9.1].) In particular, consider any initial state distribution α such that α(i) > 0
for all i ∈ S. Let µ ∈ ΠSR be a proper policy. Let yµ,α = {yµ,α(i, u) | i ∈ So, u ∈ U(i)} denote the
limiting average state-action frequency of µ for the initial state distribution α (here the control set
for the termination state is set to be U(0) = {0}.) By [Put94, Theorem 8.9.3, p. 400], yµ,α lies in the
convex hull of the limiting average state-action frequencies of stationary deterministic policies for the
initial distribution α. Since µ is proper, the termination state 0 is reached w.p.1 for all initial states
in S, and consequently, yµ,α is the vector with yµ,α(0, 0) = 1 for the termination state i = 0 and
with yµ,α(i, u) = 0 for (i, u) 6= (0, 0). This vector must be an extreme point of the convex hull just
mentioned (which is a subset of probability distributions on {(i, u) | i ∈ So, u ∈ U(i)}). Therefore,
there exists some µdet ∈ ΠSD whose limiting average state-action frequency for the initial distribution
α equals 1 at (i, u) = (0, 0). Since α(i) > 0 for all i ∈ S, this implies that the termination state 0 is
reached w.p.1 for all initial states in S under the deterministic policy µdet. Hence µdet is a proper
policy in ΠSD. This proves our claim.
22
For an SSP satisfying the SSP Model Assumption, the classical Q-learning algorithm generates a
sequence of iterates that is bounded w.p.1, as proved by Yu and Bertsekas [YB13a]. The iterates {Qˆt}
defined by Eq. (4.1) are similar to the classical Q-learning iterates, except for a small difference:
in iteration (4.1), the minimization over the controls at the successor state is done after taking
weighted averages of Q-factors (weighted according to ν¯), whereas there is no such averaging in
classical Q-learning. This difference is mostly algebraic, however. Our subsequent proof of the lower
boundedness of {Qˆt} follows essentially the lower boundedness proof given in [YB13a, Section 3.3]
for classical Q-learning.
4.1.2 Auxiliary sequence {Q˜t}
We proceed to prove that {Qˆt} given by iteration (4.1) is bounded below w.p.1 for any given initial
Qˆ0. We will do so by introducing yet another process {Q˜t} on the same probability space. The
construction of this new process will be the key to our proof.
To this end, let us replace the inf operation in iteration (4.1) and write iteration (4.1) equivalently
as follows. For every ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R and t ≥ 0,
Qˆt+1(i, u, v) = (1− γt,ℓ)Qˆt(i, u, v) + γt,ℓ
(
gˆ(i, u, v, s) + Qˆ
(ℓ)
t
(s, uℓt, ν¯s)
)
, (4.4)
where s is a shorthand for the successor state jℓt , and u
ℓ
t is a control such that
uℓt ∈ argmin
u˜∈U(s)
Qˆ
(ℓ)
t
(s, u˜, ν¯s),
where the expression Qˆ
(ℓ)
t
(s, u˜, ν¯s) for u˜ ∈ U(s) denotes the weighted average of the Q-factors:
Qˆ
(ℓ)
t
(s, u˜, ν¯s) =
∑
v˜∈V (s)
ν¯s(v˜) Qˆ
(ℓ)
t (s, u˜, v˜).
Now consider an auxiliary sequence {Q˜t} of the following form. Given some integer t0 and
Q-factor vector Q˜t0 , let
Q˜t = Q˜t0 , t ≤ t0, (4.5)
and let Q˜t+1, t ≥ t0, be defined by the recursion: for every (i, u, v) ∈ R,
Q˜t+1(i, u, v) = (1− γt,ℓ)Q˜t(i, u, v) + γt,ℓ
(
gˆ(i, u, v, s) + Q˜
(ℓ)
t
(s, uℓt, ν¯s)
)
, (4.6)
where s is a shorthand for the successor state jℓt , and the expression Q˜
(ℓ)
t
(s, uℓt, ν¯s) is a shorthand
for a weighted average of Q-factors, defined similarly to the notation Qˆ
(ℓ)
t
(s, u˜, ν¯s) above:
Q˜
(ℓ)
t
(s, uℓt , ν¯s) =
∑
v˜∈V (s)
ν¯s(v˜) Q˜
(ℓ)
t (s, u
ℓ
t , v˜),
with Q˜
(ℓ)
t representing the vector of Q-factors whose components are given by Q˜
(ℓ)
t (ℓ˜) = Q˜τℓℓ˜(t)(ℓ˜), ℓ˜ ∈
R ∪ {(0, 0, 0)} [by default Q˜t(0, 0, 0) = Q˜
(ℓ)
t (0, 0, 0) = 0 for all t]. Most importantly, the variables
γt,ℓ, j
ℓ
t , u
ℓ
t , and τℓℓ˜(t) where ℓ, ℓ˜ ∈ R, t ≥ 0, in the definition (4.6) for {Q˜t} are the same random
variables that appear in the iteration (4.4) that defines {Qˆt}.
Lemma 4.3. Consider any sample path. Then for any values of t0 and Q˜t0 , {Qˆt} is bounded below
if and only if {Q˜t} given by Eqs. (4.5)-(4.6) is bounded below.
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Proof. For every ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R and t ≥ t0, using Eqs. (4.4), (4.6), and the fact that γt,ℓ ∈ [0, 1],
we have that∣∣Qˆt+1(i, u, v)− Q˜t+1(i, u, v)∣∣ ≤ (1− γt,ℓ)∣∣Qˆt(i, u, v)− Q˜t(i, u, v)∣∣
+ γt,ℓ
∑
v˜∈V (s)
ν¯s(v˜)
∣∣Qˆ(ℓ)t (s, uℓt, v˜)− Q˜(ℓ)t (s, uℓt, v˜)∣∣
≤ max
τ≤t
‖Qˆτ − Q˜τ‖∞,
where s = jℓt . This implies that for all t ≥ t0,
max
τ≤t+1
‖Qˆτ − Q˜τ‖∞ ≤ max
τ≤t
‖Qˆτ − Q˜τ‖∞.
Hence, on a sample path, {Qˆt} is bounded below if and only if {Q˜t} is bounded below.
The sequence {Q˜t} is more convenient to work with than {Qˆt}, because by Lemma 4.3 we
have the freedom to choose for each sample path the initial time t0 and initial value Q˜t0 so that the
resulting sequence {Q˜t} has a certain desirable structure. In the next step of the proof, we will make
such a choice that will equate {Q˜t} to the costs in certain single-player SSP problems “neighboring”
SSP(ν¯), in the sense that the parameters of these SSP problems lie close to those of SSP(ν¯).
Before we proceed, we need some notation and definitions for various neighborhoods of the model
parameters, which we will use throughout the rest of the proof.
4.1.3 Some notation and definitions
As before, for a finite set A, we denote by P(A) the set of probability distributions on A, and for
a ∈ A and p ∈ P(A), we write p(a) for the probability of a under p. The support of p, denoted
supp(p), is the set {a ∈ A | p(a) 6= 0}. For p1, p2 ∈ P(A), we write p1 ≪ p2 if p1 is absolutely
continuous with respect to p2, that is, supp(p1) ⊂ supp(p2).
We use the following notation to represent the neighborhoods of the transition probability and
one-stage cost parameters of SSP(ν¯) within certain affine subspaces. (The parameters of SSP(ν¯) are
defined in Definition 4.1 and will be referred to below.)
• For each ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R, let pℓo ∈ P(So) denote the transition probability distribution at state
ℓ in SSP(ν¯), that is, pℓo(j) = pij(u, v), ∀j ∈ So. For each δ > 0, define N¯δ(p
ℓ
o) to be the set
of probability distributions that are not only in the δ-neighborhood of pℓo but also absolutely
continuous with respect to pℓo, i.e.,
N¯δ(p
ℓ
o) =
{
d ∈ P(So)
∣∣ |d(j)− pℓo(j)| ≤ δ, ∀ j ∈ So, and d≪ pℓo}.
• Denote R1o = {(i, u) | i ∈ So, u ∈ U(i)} where U(0) = {0} denotes the (dummy) control
set for the termination state 0. (This is the set of state-control pairs for player I.) For each
(i, u) ∈ R1o, let p
iu
ν¯ ∈ P(So) denote the transition probability distribution at state i with control
u in SSP(ν¯): piuν¯ (j) = pν¯,ij(u), ∀j ∈ So. For each δ > 0, define N¯δ(p
iu
ν¯ ) to be the subset of
distributions in the δ-neighborhood of piuν¯ that are absolutely continuous with respect to p
iu
ν¯ :
N¯δ(p
iu
ν¯ ) =
{
d ∈ P(So)
∣∣ |d(j)− piuν¯ (j)| ≤ δ, ∀ j ∈ So, and d≪ piuν¯ }.
In particular, for (i, u) = (0, 0), piuν¯ (0) = 1 and N¯δ(p
iu
ν¯ ) =
{
piuν¯
}
.
• Let g = {g(i, u, v) | (i, u, v) ∈ R} be the vector of expected one-stage costs for the states in R
in SSP(ν¯). Define N¯δ(g) to be the δ-neighborhood of g: with c = {c(i, u, v) | (i, u, v) ∈ R},
N¯δ(g) =
{
c
∣∣ |c(i, u, v)− g(i, u, v)| ≤ δ, ∀ (i, u, v) ∈ R}.
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• Similarly, let gν¯ = {gν¯(i, u) | (i, u) ∈ R1o} be the vector of expected one-stage costs for the
state-control pairs in R1o in SSP(ν¯). Define N¯δ(gν¯) to be the intersection of the δ-neighborhood
of gν¯ with a subspace: with c = {c(i, u) | (i, u) ∈ R1o},
N¯δ(gν¯) =
{
c
∣∣ |c(i, u)− gν¯(i, u)| ≤ δ, ∀ (i, u) ∈ R1o, and c(0, 0) = 0}.
For brevity, we will simply call the above sets N¯δ(pℓo), N¯δ(p
iu
ν¯ ), N¯δ(g) and N¯δ(gν¯) the δ-neighborhoods
of the respective parameters of SSP(ν¯).
4.1.4 Choose t0 and initial Q˜t0 for a sample path and δ > 0
To initialize the auxiliary sequence {Q˜t} defined by Eqs. (4.5)-(4.6), we will choose time t0 and vector
Q˜t0 based on the information of an entire sample path. First, we define two random sequences on
the same probability space as the process {Qˆt}: a sequence {g˜t} of one-stage cost vectors, and a
sequence {qt} of collections of probability distributions on So. They will be used to determine the
values of t0 and Q˜t0 on a sample path, for any chosen δ > 0.
The sequence {g˜t} can be related to the empirical one-stage costs and is defined recursively as
follows. For t ≥ 0,
g˜t+1(i, u, v) =
(
1− γt,ℓ
)
g˜t(i, u, v) + γt,ℓ gˆ
(
i, u, v, jℓt
)
, ∀ ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R, (4.7)
with g˜0(·) ≡ 0 for t = 0. By the standard theory of stochastic approximation (see e.g., [BT96, Prop.
4.1 and Example 4.3, p. 141-143] or [KY03, Bor08]), Eqs. (3.9) and (3.11) imply that
g˜t(i, u, v)
a.s.
→ g(i, u, v), ∀ (i, u, v) ∈ R, (4.8)
where “a.s.” stands for “almost surely,” “w.p.1.”
The sequence {qt} can be related to empirical frequencies of state transitions and is defined
recursively as follows. It has |R| component sequences, {qℓt}, ℓ ∈ R. For each ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R, let
qℓ0 ∈ P(So), q
ℓ
0 ≪ p
ℓ
o,
and let
qℓt+1 =
(
1− γt,ℓ
)
qℓt + γt,ℓ ejℓ
t
, t ≥ 0, (4.9)
where for j ∈ So, ej ∈ P(So) denotes the distribution with ej(j) = 1. Then for all ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R,
we have
qℓt
a.s.
→ pℓo and q
ℓ
t ≪ p
ℓ
o w.p.1, ∀ t ≥ 0, (4.10)
where the first relation follows from Eqs. (3.9), (3.11) and the standard theory of stochastic approx-
imation, and the second relation follows from the fact that jℓt is a random successor state of state i
with controls (u, v).
Equations (4.8), (4.10) indicate that the sequences {g˜t(i, u, v)} and {qℓt}, ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R,
converge to the corresponding one-stage cost and transition probability parameters of SSP(ν¯). We
then obtain the following lemma, with which we will choose the initial time t0.
Lemma 4.4. There exists a set of probability one on which, given any δ > 0, there is a path-
dependent time t0 such that
qℓt ∈ N¯δ(p
ℓ
o), g˜t ∈ N¯δ(g), ∀ ℓ ∈ R, t ≥ t0. (4.11)
In the rest of the proof, we consider any sample path from the set of probability one given in
Lemma 4.4. For any given δ > 0, we choose t0 given in Lemma 4.4 to be the initial time of the
auxiliary sequence {Q˜t}. (Note that t0 depends on the entire path and hence so does Q˜t for all t.)
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We now define the initial Q˜t0 . Let us fix some policy µ ∈ Π1,SR that is proper for the single-player
problem SSP(ν¯). (Such a policy exists because ν¯ is an essentially proper policy of the game and
SSP(ν¯) satisfies the SSP Model Assumption; cf. the proof of Lemma 4.2, Section 4.1.1.) Associate
with t0 and each ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R a time-inhomogeneous Markov chain (i0, u0, v0), (i1, u1), (i2, u2), . . .
with time-varying one-stage costs as follows:
• The initial state of this Markov chain is (i0, u0, v0) = (i, u, v). The state space for time k = 0
is R and for time k ≥ 1 is S0 × U where U = ∪i∈SoU(i) (the control space of player I).
• The probability distribution of this Markov chain, denoted Pℓt0 , is defined by time-varying
transition probabilities: for all (¯i, u¯), (j¯, w¯) ∈ R1o,
Pℓt0
(
i1 = j¯, u1 = w¯ | i0 = i, u0 = u, v0 = v
)
= qℓt0(j¯) · µ(w¯ | j¯), for k = 1, (4.12)
Pℓt0
(
ik = j¯, uk = w¯ | ik−1 = i¯, uk−1 = u¯
)
= pi¯u¯ν¯ (j¯) · µ(w¯ | j¯), for k ≥ 2. (4.13)
The transition probabilities at those (¯i, u¯) 6∈ R1o can be defined arbitrarily because the chain
has zero probability to visit such state-control pairs at any time, in view of the fact that µ is
a policy for SSP(ν¯).
• Define time-varying one-stage cost functions gℓ,t00 : R 7→ ℜ and g
ℓ,t0
k : R
1
o 7→ ℜ, k ≥ 1, to be
gℓ,t00 = g˜t0 , g
ℓ,t0
k = gν¯ , k ≥ 1. (4.14)
For k ≥ 1, we extend gℓ,t0k to So × U by defining its values outside the domain R
1
o to be +∞,
and we will treat 0 · ∞ = 0. This convention will be followed throughout.
We now define for every ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R,
Q˜t0(i, u, v) = g
ℓ,t0
0 (i, u, v) + E
P
ℓ
t0
[ ∞∑
k=1
gℓ,t0k (ik, uk)
]
, (4.15)
where Pℓt0 in the superscript indicates that the expectation is taken with respect to it. The above
expectation is well-defined and finite, and furthermore, the order of summation and expectation can
be exchanged, i.e.,
Q˜t0(i, u, v) = g
ℓ,t0
0 (i, u, v) +
∞∑
k=1
EP
ℓ
t0
[
gℓ,t0k (ik, uk)
]
.
This is because according to the preceding definition of the Markov chain associated with t0 and
ℓ = (i, u, v), under Pℓt0 , from time 1 onwards, the process {(ik, uk), k ≥ 1} evolves and incurs costs
as in SSP(ν¯) under the proper policy µ [cf. Eqs. (4.12)-(4.14)], and consequently,
∑∞
k=1 |g
ℓ,t0
k (ik, uk)|
is finite almost surely and its expectation is finite with respect to Pℓt0 .
The definition of Q˜t0 above has two key properties:
(i) Each component Q˜t0(i, u, v) equals the expected total cost of some randomized Markov pol-
icy(which is µ here) in a time-inhomogeneous (single-player) SSP problem.
(ii) The parameters of that SSP problem, i.e., transition probabilities and one-stage costs, all lie
in the δ-neighborhoods N¯δ(pℓo), N¯δ(p
iu
ν¯ ), N¯δ(g), N¯δ(gν¯) of the corresponding parameters of
SSP(ν¯).
We now show that these properties are preserved in Q˜t, t ≥ t0 defined by iteration (4.6).
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4.1.5 Interpret {Q˜t} as total costs in certain SSP problems neighboring SSP(ν¯)
The next lemma states precisely the interpretation we need of the auxiliary sequence {Q˜t} resulting
from the preceding choice of t0 and Q˜t0 . Briefly speaking, each component of Q˜t, t ≥ t0, is equal
to the expected total cost of a randomized Markov policy (represented by {µℓ,tk , k ≥ 1} below) in
a time-inhomogeneous SSP problem whose parameters (transition probabilities and one-stage costs,
represented by {pℓ,tk , g
ℓ,t
k , k ≥ 0} below) lie in the δ-neighborhoods of the corresponding parameters
of SSP(ν¯).
Lemma 4.5. Let the sequences {g˜t} and {qℓt}, ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R be as defined by Eqs. (4.7), (4.9),
respectively. Consider any sample path from the set of probability one given in Lemma 4.4. For
any δ > 0, with t0 and Q˜t0 given as in Section 4.1.4 for the chosen δ, the sequence {Q˜t} defined by
Eqs. (4.5)-(4.6) has the following properties. For each ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R and t ≥ 0:
(a) Q˜t(i, u, v) can be expressed as
Q˜t(i, u, v) = g
ℓ,t
0 (i0, u0, v0) + E
P
ℓ
t
[ ∞∑
k=1
gℓ,tk (ik, uk)
]
= gℓ,t0 (i0, u0, v0) +
∞∑
k=1
EP
ℓ
t
[
gℓ,tk (ik, uk)
]
for some probability distribution Pℓt of a time-inhomogeneous Markov chain (i0, u0, v0), (i1, u1),
(i2, u2), . . . with (i0, u0, v0) = (i, u, v) and (ik, uk) ∈ So × U for k ≥ 1, and for some one-stage
cost functions gℓ,t0 : R 7→ ℜ, g
ℓ,t
k : R
1
o 7→ ℜ, k ≥ 1 (with g
ℓ,t
k ≡ +∞ on (So × U) \R
1
o).
(b) The transition probabilities of the Markov chain in (a) are time-varying and have the following
product form: for all (¯i, u¯), (j¯, w¯) ∈ R1o,
Pℓt
(
i1 = j¯, u1 = w¯ | i0 = i, u0 = u, v0 = v
)
= pℓ,t0 (j¯ | i, u, v) · µ
ℓ,t
1 (w¯ | j¯), for k = 1,
Pℓt
(
ik = j¯, uk = w¯ | ik−1 = i¯, uk−1 = u¯
)
= pℓ,tk−1(j¯ | i¯, u¯) · µ
ℓ,t
k (w¯ | j¯), for k ≥ 2,
where pℓ,tk and µ
ℓ,t
k are conditional probability distributions such that for all k ≥ 1 and (¯i, u¯) ∈
R1o, j¯ ∈ So,
pℓ,tk (· | i¯, u¯) ∈ N¯δ
(
pi¯u¯ν¯
)
, µℓ,tk (· | j¯) ∈ P(U) with supp
(
µℓ,tk (· | j¯)
)
⊂ U(j¯),
and for k = 0, pℓ,t0 (· | i, u, v) ∈ N¯δ
(
pℓo
)
with pℓ,t0 (· | i, u, v) = q
ℓ
t when t ≥ t0.
(c) The one-stage cost functions gℓ,tk in (a) satisfy
gℓ,t0 ∈ N¯δ(g), g
ℓ,t
k ∈ N¯δ(gν¯), k ≥ 1,
with gℓ,t0 (i, u, v) = g˜t(i, u, v) for t ≥ t0.
(d) For the Markov chain in (a), there exists an integer kt ≥ 1 such that {(ik, uk), k ≥ kt} evolves
and incurs costs as in SSP(ν¯) under the proper policy µ; i.e., for k ≥ kt,
µℓ,tk (· | i¯) = µ(· | i¯), p
ℓ,t
k (· | i¯, u¯) = p
i¯u¯
ν¯ , g
ℓ,t
k (¯i, u¯) = gν¯ (¯i, u¯), ∀ (¯i, u¯) ∈ R
1
o.
The proof of Lemma 4.5 is by induction on t for each (i, u, v) ∈ R. In the proof, we construct
the one-stage cost functions and transition probabilities for the time-inhomogeneous Markov chain
associated with t + 1, and this procedure resembles the construction of a cost-equivalent Markov
policy in the classical MDP theory, for any given history-dependent policy and any given initial state.
Other than the construction, the proof of Lemma 4.5 consists of mostly straightforward verifications
of the properties (a)-(d) in the statement. Nevertheless, the verifications turn out to be lengthy, so
we give the proof of Lemma 4.5 in 4.2.
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4.1.6 Lower boundedness of {Q˜t}
We now come to the final step of our boundedness analysis: to lower-bound the optimal total costs
of those time-inhomogeneous SSP problems neighboring SSP(ν¯) and thereby lower-bound {Q˜t}. As
we have shown with Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5, for each sample path from a set of probability one, and for
each δ > 0, we can construct a sequence {Q˜t} such that Q˜t(i, u, v) for each (i, u, v) ∈ R and t ≥ 0
is the expected total cost of a randomized Markov policy in an SSP problem that has time-varying
transition and one-stage cost parameters lying in the δ-neighborhoods of the respective parameters
of SSP(ν¯). As we show below, when δ is sufficiently small, the total costs in all such neighboring
SSP problems can be bounded uniformly from below.
Let us be precise about the type of SSP problems involved here. Consider all time-inhomogenous
SSP problems that have the same state-control space as SSP(ν¯) and have initial states in R [cf.
the definition of SSP(ν¯) given in Definition 4.1]. For such an SSP, denote by pk and gk its state
transition probability and its one-stage cost function, respectively, at the kth stage. Let us call such
an SSP a δ-perturbed version of SSP(ν¯) if for k = 0,
g0 ∈ N¯δ(g), p0(· | i, u, v) ∈ N¯δ(p
ℓ
o), ∀ ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R,
and for k ≥ 1,
gk ∈ N¯δ(gν¯), pk(· | i, u) ∈ N¯δ(p
iu
ν¯ ), ∀ (i, u) ∈ R
1
o.
Because SSP(ν¯) satisfies the SSP Model Assumption (Lemma 4.2), we have the following lemma.
It was proved in Yu and Bertsekas [YB13a, Section 3.3.4] and we will not repeat the proof here.
The idea of the proof is to consider a time-homogeneous compact-control SSP problem where the
controls include not only the regular controls but also the transition/one-stage cost parameters in
the δ-neighborhoods N¯δ(pℓo), N¯δ(p
iu
ν¯ ), N¯δ(g), N¯δ(gν¯) of the respective parameters of SSP(ν¯), and
to show that the optimal total costs of this compact-control SSP are finite when δ is sufficiently
small, by using a continuity argument together with the fact that SSP(ν¯) satisfies the SSP model
assumption and hence has finite optimal total costs by [BT91].
Lemma 4.6 ([YB13a, Section 3.3.4]). There exist δ¯ > 0 and a finite constant C such that for all
δ ∈ [0, δ¯], the optimal total cost of any δ-perturbed version of SSP(ν¯), for any initial state, is greater
than C.
Combining Lemma 4.5 with Lemma 4.6, we obtain the boundedness of {Q˜t} as stated below.
Lemma 4.7. Let δ ∈ (0, δ¯] where δ¯ is as given in Lemma 4.6. Then on any sample path from the
set of probability one given in Lemma 4.4, with t0 and Q˜0 defined as in Section 4.1.4 for the chosen
δ, the sequence {Q˜t} defined by Eqs. (4.5)-(4.6) is bounded below.
Lemma 4.7 together with Lemma 4.3 implies that the sequence {Qˆt} generated by the itera-
tion (4.1) is bounded below w.p.1, which in turn implies, by Lemma 4.1, that the Q-learning iterates
{Qt} are bounded below w.p.1. A symmetric argument then yields that {Qt} is bounded above
w.p.1, as we explained at the beginning of Section 4.1. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1 on
the boundedness of Q-learning iterates {Qt} for SSP games satisfying Assumption 3.1.
4.2 Boundedness Analysis for a Special Case
If instead of Assumption 3.1, we make a stronger model assumption on the SSP game, then there
is a simpler proof of the boundedness (and hence convergence) of Q-learning iterates, based on a
contraction argument. We present this analysis to conclude Section 4.
First, let us define a notion of proper policies for an SSP game and use it to formulate the
stronger model assumption just mentioned. (Our definition of properness differs slightly from that
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in [PB99].) Recall that a pair of policies of the two players is non-prolonging if under those policies,
the termination state is reached w.p.1 for all initial states.
Definition 4.2 (Proper Policies in a Finite-Space SSP Game). For a finite-space SSP game, we
say a policy µ ∈ Π1,SR of player I is proper if for every policy ν ∈ Π2,SR of player II, (µ, ν) is non-
prolonging. Similarly, we say a policy ν ∈ Π2,SR of player II is proper if for every policy µ ∈ Π1,SR
of player I, (µ, ν) is non-prolonging.
Assumption 4.1. The following holds in a finite-space SSP game:
(i) Every player has a proper stationary randomized policy.
(ii) For any pair of policies (µ, ν) ∈ Π1,SR × Π2,SR that is prolonging, J(i;µ, ν) = +∞ or −∞ for
at least one initial state i.
By Definition 4.2, if a player plays a proper policy, the optimal total costs or rewards for the other
player are finite for all initial states. Therefore, an SSP game that satisfies the model conditions
in Assumption 4.1 also satisfies Assumption 3.1. Consequently, the optimality results of Section 3
and the boundedness and convergence theorems for Q-learning hold under Assumption 4.1 as well.
However, for proper policies of either players, the dynamic programing operators of their associated
single-player problems exhibit a contraction property. This gives us a shortcut to prove the bound-
edness of Q-learning iterates under Assumption 4.1(i), without resorting to the long, general-case
proof given earlier.
Proposition 4.1 (Boundedness of Q-Learning Iterates in the Presence of Proper Policies). Suppose
there exists a proper policy µ¯ ∈ Π1,SR of player I (ν¯ ∈ Π2,SR of player II, respectively) in a finite-space
SSP game. Then under Assumption 3.2(i)-(iii) and (v), for any given initial Q0, the sequence {Qt}
generated by the Q-learning algorithm (3.8) is bounded above (below, respectively) w.p.1.
We will prove the lower-boundedness part of Prop. 4.1. By symmetry, the upper-boundedness
part of Prop. 4.1 follows from applying the same argument to the process {−Qt}. We start with a
mapping Fν¯ : ℜ|R| → ℜ|R| for a policy ν¯ ∈ Π2,SR defined by
(Fν¯Q)(i, u, v) := g(i, u, v) +
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v) inf
u˜∈U(j)
Q
(
j, u˜, ν¯j
)
, ∀ (i, u, v) ∈ R, ∀Q, (4.16)
where
ν¯j = ν¯(· | j) and Q
(
j, u˜, ν¯j
)
=
∑
v˜∈V (j)
ν¯j(v˜)Q(j, u˜, v˜).
Given a positive vector ξ = {ξ(i, u, v) | (i, u, v) ∈ R}, let ‖ · ‖ξ denote the weighted sup-norm on the
space of Q-factors given by ‖Q‖ξ = max(i,u,v)∈R
|Q(i,u,v)|
ξ(i,u,v) .
Lemma 4.8. For a proper policy ν¯ ∈ Π2,SR, Fν¯ given by Eq. (4.16) is a contraction with respect to
some weighted sup-norm ‖ · ‖ξ, i.e., for some β ∈ [0, 1),
‖Fν¯Q− Fν¯Q
′‖ξ ≤ β ‖Q−Q
′‖ξ, ∀Q,Q
′.
Proof. First, we define a single-player SSP problem and use its optimal total costs to construct the
weight vector ξ in the desired norm ‖ · ‖ξ, similar to the proofs of [BT96, Prop. 2.2, p. 23-24] and
[PB99, Lemma 4.1]. Consider a single-player SSP problem on the state space So ∪ R where the
system dynamics are the same as those of SSP(ν¯) given in Definition 4.1, and all the one-stage costs
are −1 except for that at the cost-free termination state 0. Because ν¯ is a proper policy of player
II, by the definition of a proper policy in an SSP game (cf. Definition 4.2), the single-player SSP
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problem just defined satisfies the SSP Model Assumption (cf. Section 2.2). Therefore, by [BT91], its
optimal total cost function Jˆ∗ is finite at all states in So∪R and satisfies the dynamic programming
equation
Jˆ∗(i, u, v) = −1 +
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v) Jˆ
∗(j), ∀ (i, u, v) ∈ R, (4.17)
Jˆ∗(i) = −1 + min
u∈U(i)
∑
j∈S
pν¯,ij(u) Jˆ
∗(j), ∀ i ∈ S. (4.18)
We also have that Jˆ∗(i) ≤ −1 and Jˆ∗(i, u, v) ≤ −1 for every state i and (i, u, v), since the one-stage
costs before termination are −1.
Let us define
ξ(i, u, v) = −Jˆ∗(i, u, v) ≥ 1, (i, u, v) ∈ R,
ξν¯(i, u) =
∑
v∈V (i)
ν¯i(v) ξ(i, u, v), i ∈ S, u ∈ U(i).
For every i ∈ S and u ∈ U(i), by Eqs. (4.17)-(4.18) and the definition of pν¯,ij [cf. Definition 4.1(2)],
ξν¯(i, u) = −
(
− 1 +
∑
j∈S
pν¯,ij(u) Jˆ
∗(j)
)
≤ −
(
− 1 + min
u˜∈U(i)
∑
j∈S
pν¯,ij(u˜) Jˆ
∗(j)
)
= −Jˆ∗(i),
and hence
sup
u∈U(i)
ξν¯(i, u) ≤ −Jˆ
∗(i), ∀ i ∈ S.
Then with β = max(i,u,v)∈R
ξ(i,u,v)−1
ξ(i,u,v) ∈ [0, 1). we have for every (i, u, v) ∈ R,∑
j∈S
pij(u, v) sup
u˜∈U(j)
ξν¯(j, u˜) ≤
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v)
(
− Jˆ∗(j)
)
= ξ(i, u, v)− 1 ≤ β ξ(i, u, v), (4.19)
where the equality follows from Eq. (4.17).
We now prove that Fν¯ is a contraction with respect to ‖·‖ξ and with modulus β. By the definition
of Fν¯ [cf. Eq. (4.16)], for every (i, u, v) ∈ R,∣∣(Fν¯Q)(i, u, v)− (Fν¯Q′)(i, u, v)∣∣ = ∣∣∣∑
j∈S
pij(u, v)
(
inf
u˜∈U(j)
Qν¯(j, u˜)− inf
u˜∈U(j)
Q′ν¯(j, u˜)
)∣∣∣,
where we defineQν¯(j, u˜) =
∑
v˜∈V (j) ν¯j(v˜)Q(j, u˜, v˜) and we defineQ
′
ν¯(j, u˜) similarly. Let ∆ = |Q−Q
′|
(the absolute values are taken component-wise). Using the preceding equation, we have for every
(i, u, v) ∈ R,∣∣(Fν¯Q)(i, u, v)− (Fν¯Q′)(i, u, v)∣∣ ≤∑
j∈S
pij(u, v) sup
u˜∈U(j)
∑
v˜∈V (j)
ν¯j(v˜)∆(j, u˜, v˜)
=
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v) sup
u˜∈U(j)
∑
v˜∈V (j)
ν¯j(v˜) ξ(j, u˜, v˜) ·
∆(j, u˜, v˜)
ξ(j, u˜, v˜)
≤ ‖Q−Q′‖ξ ·
∑
j∈S
pij(u, v) sup
u˜∈U(j)
ξν¯(j, u˜)
≤ ‖Q−Q′‖ξ · β ξ(i, u, v),
where the last inequality follows from Eq. (4.19). This implies ‖Fν¯Q− Fν¯Q′‖ξ ≤ β‖Q−Q′‖ξ.
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Proof of Prop. 4.1. We prove the lower-boundedness part of the proposition; as mentioned earlier,
the upper-boundedness part follows from applying the same argument to the process {−Qt}.
Consider the process {Qˆt} defined by the iteration (4.1) with ν¯ being a proper policy of player II.
By Lemma 4.1, to prove that the sequence {Qt} of Q-learning iterates is bounded below w.p.1, it
is sufficient to prove that {Qˆt} is bounded below w.p.1. Now the iteration (4.1) for {Qˆt} can be
equivalently written as: for every ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R and t ≥ 0,
Qˆt+1(i, u, v) = (1− γt,ℓ)Qˆt(i, u, v) + γt,ℓ
(
Fν¯Qˆ
(ℓ)
t
)
(i, u, v) + γt,ℓwt,ℓ,
where Fν¯ is the mapping given by (4.16) and wt,ℓ is a noise term given by
wt,ℓ = gˆ(i, u, v, s) + inf
ρ∈U¯(s)
Qˆ
(ℓ)
t
(s, ρ, ν¯s)−
(
Fν¯Qˆ
(ℓ)
t
)
(i, u, v) with s = jℓt .
By Lemma 4.8, Fν¯ is a contraction with respect to a weighted sup-norm, so we can apply the result
of [Tsi94] for asynchronous stochastic approximation algorithms involving contraction mappings.
Direct calculation shows that for any given Qˆ0, under Assumption (3.2)(i)-(iii), the noise terms,
wt,ℓ, ℓ ∈ R, t ≥ 0, satisfy the conditional mean and variance conditions required in the analysis
of [Tsi94]: E
[
wt,ℓ | Ft
]
= 0 w.p.1, and E
[
w2t,ℓ | Ft
]
≤ A + Bmaxℓ′∈Rmaxτ≤t |Qˆτ (ℓ
′)|2 w.p.1, for
some deterministic constants A and B. Therefore, by [Tsi94, Theorem 1], for any given Qˆ0 = Q0,
{Qˆt} is bounded w.p.1 under Assumption (3.2)(i)-(iii) and (v). [Assumption (3.2)(iv) is not needed
for bounding the iterates, although it is needed for establishing their convergence.] As mentioned
earlier, by Lemma 4.1, this implies that for any given initial Q0, {Qt} is bounded below w.p.1.
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Appendix A Proof of Lemma 4.5
The proof is by induction on t. For t = t0, Q˜t0 satisfies the properties (a)-(d) in the lemma by its
definition and our choice of the sample path and t0 [cf. Lemma 4.4 and Eqs. (4.12)-(4.15)]. Since
Q˜t = Q˜t0 for t < t0, they also satisfy properties (a)-(d). So consider t ≥ t0 and suppose these
properties are satisfied by all Q˜τ , 0 ≤ τ ≤ t. Let us show that they are satisfied by Q˜t+1.
Consider Q˜t+1(i, u, v) for each ℓ = (i, u, v) ∈ R. To simplify notation, denote γ = γt,ℓ ∈ [0, 1] (cf.
Lemma 4.4). By Eq. (4.6),
Q˜t+1(i, u, v) = (1− γ) Q˜t(i, u, v) + γ
(
gˆ(i, u, v, s) + Q˜
(ℓ)
t
(s, u˜, ν¯s)
)
, (A.1)
where s = jℓt , u˜ = u
ℓ
t, Q˜
(ℓ)
t
(s, u˜, ν¯s) =
∑
v˜∈V (s) ν¯s(v˜) Q˜
(ℓ)
t (s, u˜, v˜), and
Q˜
(ℓ)
t (s, u˜, v˜) = Q˜τℓℓv˜ (t)(s, u˜, v˜) with ℓv˜ = (s, u˜, v˜), τℓℓv˜(t) ≤ t, ∀ v˜ ∈ V (s).
Let us use the simplified notation τv˜ = τℓℓv˜ (t) for v˜ ∈ V (s). By the induction hypothesis, we can
express Q˜t(i, u, v) and each term Q˜τℓℓv˜ (t)(s, u˜, v˜), v˜ ∈ V (s), for s 6= 0, in the form given in the
statement (a) of the lemma. Thus when s 6= 0, we can write Eq. (A.1) as
Q˜t+1(i, u, v) = (1− γ) g
ℓ,t
0 (i, u, v) + (1− γ)
∞∑
k=1
EP
ℓ
t
[
gℓ,tk (ik, uk)
]
+ γ gˆ(i, u, v, s) + γ
∑
v˜∈V (s)
ν¯s(v˜) ·
(
gℓv˜,τv˜0 (s, u˜, v˜) +
∞∑
k=1
EP
ℓv˜
τv˜
[
gℓv˜,τv˜k (ik, uk)
])
=
∞∑
k=0
Ck (A.2)
where
C0 = (1− γ) g
ℓ,t
0 (i, u, v) + γ gˆ(i, u, v, s), (A.3)
C1 = (1− γ) E
P
ℓ
t
[
gℓ,t1 (i1, u1)
]
+ γ
∑
v˜∈V (s)
ν¯s(v˜) · g
ℓv˜,τv˜
0 (s, u˜, v˜), (A.4)
Ck = (1− γ) E
P
ℓ
t
[
gℓ,tk (ik, uk)
]
+ γ
∑
v˜∈V (s)
ν¯s(v˜) · E
P
ℓv˜
τv˜
[
gℓv˜,τv˜k−1 (ik−1, uk−1)
]
, k ≥ 2. (A.5)
For the sake of convenience, let us define a few terms for the case s = 0 and make the above
formulas valid for s = 0 as well. Recall that for s = 0, we have U(0) = V (0) = {0} and with
v˜ = 0, ℓv˜ = (0, 0, 0) and Q˜τ (s, u˜, v˜) = Q˜τ (0, 0, 0) = 0 for all τ . Let us set τv˜ = 0 in this case (since
this term can be defined arbitrarily). To express 0 in the form given in the lemma, let us simply
define Pℓv˜τv˜ in this case to be the probability distribution of the Markov chain {(ik, uk), k ≥ 0}
that starts from the absorbing termination state (i0, u0) = (0, 0); let g
ℓv˜,τv˜
0 (0, 0, 0) = 0 and let
gℓv˜,τv˜0 coincide with g elsewhere; and let g
ℓv˜,τv˜
k = gν¯ , k ≥ 1. With these definitions, we have
0 = gℓv˜,τv˜0 (s, u˜, v˜) +
∑∞
k=1 E
P
ℓv˜
τv˜
[
gℓv˜,τv˜k (ik, uk)
]
and Eq. (A.2) holds for s = 0. For later use, let us
also define transition probabilities and other quantities so that some properties in the statement of
the lemma hold for s = 0. In particular, let µℓv˜,τv˜k = µ, p
ℓv˜,τv˜
k (· | i¯, u¯) = p
i¯u¯
ν¯ for k ≥ 1 and (¯i, u¯) ∈ R
1
o,
and also let pℓv˜,τv˜0 (· | 0, 0, 0) = p
00
ν¯ (i.e., p
ℓv˜,τv˜
0 (0 | 0, 0, 0) = 1). Then P
ℓv˜
τv˜
can be expressed in the
product form given in property (b), and it satisfies property (d) with kτv˜ = 1.
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We now rewrite each term Ck in the above expression of Q˜t+1(i, u, v) in a desirable form, first
for k = 0, then for k ≥ 2, and finally, for k = 1. During this procedure, we will define the
transition probabilities pℓ,t+1k and µ
ℓ,t+1
k that compose the probability distribution P
ℓ
t+1 of the time-
inhomogenous Markov chain for t+ 1, as well as the one-stage cost functions gℓ,t+1k required in the
statement of the lemma.
For k = 0: By property (c) of the induction hypothesis, gℓ,t0 (i, u, v) = g˜t(i, u, v). Using this and
the definition of {g˜t} [cf. Eq. (4.7)], we have that
C0 = (1− γ) g˜t(i, u, v) + γ gˆ(i, u, v, s) = g˜t+1(i, u, v). (A.6)
Let the cost function gℓ,t+10 and transition probability p
ℓ,t+1
0 (· | i, u, v) be
gℓ,t+10 = g˜t+1, p
ℓ,t+1
0 (· | i, u, v) = q
ℓ
t+1. (A.7)
By Lemma 4.4 and our choice of the sample path, gℓ,t+10 and p
ℓ,t+1
0 satisfy the requirements in
properties (b) and (c), that is,
gℓ,t+10 ∈ N¯δ(g), p
ℓ,t+1
0 (· | i, u, v) ∈ N¯δ
(
pℓo
)
.
For k ≥ 2: Let P k1 denote the law of (ik, uk, ik+1) under P
ℓ
t , and for each v˜ ∈ V (s), let P
k,v˜
2 denote
the law of (ik−1, uk−1, ik) under P
ℓv˜
τv˜
. Let P k3 denote the convex combination of them,
P k3 = (1− γ)P
k
1 + γ
∑
v˜∈V (s)
ν¯s(v˜) · P
k,v˜
2 . (A.8)
We regard these laws as probability measures on the sample space Ω˜ = So ×U × So, and we denote
by X,Y and Z the function that maps a point ω = (¯i, u¯, j¯) ∈ Ω˜ to its 1st, 2nd and 3rd coordinate,
respectively. Using property (b) of Pℓt and P
ℓv˜
τv˜
from the induction hypothesis (in particular, using
the property of {µℓ,tk , k ≥ 1}, {µ
ℓv˜,τv˜
k , k ≥ 1}), it is clear that supp(P
k
3 ) ⊂ R
1
o × So, a subset of Ω˜.
So we can write the term Ck in Eq. (A.5) for each k ≥ 2 as∑
i¯∈So
∑
u¯∈U (¯i)
(
(1− γ)P k1 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) · g
ℓ,t
k (¯i, u¯) + γ
∑
v˜∈V (s)
ν¯s(v˜) · P
k,v˜
2 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) · g
ℓv˜,τv˜
k−1 (¯i, u¯)
)
.
Next we will define the kth-stage cost function gℓ,t+1k so that we can rewrite the above expression
of Ck equivalently as
Ck =
∑
i¯∈So
∑
u¯∈U (¯i)
P k3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) · g
ℓ,t+1
k (¯i, u¯). (A.9)
We will also define the transition probabilities µℓ,t+1k (· | i¯) and p
ℓ,t+1
k (· | i¯, u¯) for all (¯i, u¯) ∈ R
1
o so
that we have for every (¯i, u¯) ∈ R1o and j¯ ∈ So,
P k3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) = P
k
3 (X = i¯) · µ
ℓ,t+1
k (u¯ | i¯), (A.10)
P k3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯, Z = j¯) = P
k
3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) · p
ℓ,t+1
k (j¯ | i¯, u¯). (A.11)
We define the cost function gℓ,t+1k as follows. For each (¯i, u¯) ∈ R
1
o, if P
k
3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) = 0, let
gℓ,t+1k (¯i, u¯) = gν¯ (¯i, u¯); otherwise, let
gℓ,t+1k (¯i, u¯) =
(1− γ)P k1 (X = i¯, Y = u¯)
P k3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯)
· gℓ,tk (¯i, u¯) +
∑
v˜∈V (s)
γ ν¯s(v˜)P
k,v˜
2 (X = i¯, Y = u¯)
P k3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯)
· gℓv˜,τv˜k−1 (¯i, u¯).
(A.12)
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Then, by the definition of P k3 [cf. Eq. (A.8)], Eq. (A.9) clearly holds. Observe from Eq. (A.12)
that gℓ,t+1k (¯i, u¯) is a convex combination of g
ℓ,t
k (¯i, u¯) and g
ℓv˜,τv˜
k−1 (¯i, u¯), v˜ ∈ V (s). The latter terms,
by property (c) of the induction hypothesis and by the definitions we gave for the case s = 0, all
lie in the δ-neighborhood of gν¯ (¯i, u¯), and they all equal gν¯ (¯i, u¯) = 0 if (¯i, u¯) = (0, 0). Hence, when
P k3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) > 0 and g
ℓ,t+1
k (¯i, u¯) is given by Eq. (A.12),
∣∣gℓ,t+1k (¯i, u¯) − gν¯ (¯i, u¯)∣∣ ≤ δ, and
gℓ,t+1k (¯i, u¯) = 0 if (¯i, u¯) = (0, 0). This shows that g
ℓ,t+1
k satisfies the requirement in property (c) for
t+ 1: gℓ,t+1k ∈ N¯δ(gν¯).
Reasoning similarly, since by property (d) of the induction hypothesis, when k ≥ kt and k ≥
maxv˜∈V (s) kτv˜ + 1, g
ℓ,t
k (¯i, u¯) = g
ℓv˜,τv˜
k−1 (¯i, u¯) = gν¯ (¯i, u¯) for all v˜ ∈ V (s) and (¯i, u¯) ∈ R
1
o, it follows that
gℓ,t+1k satisfies the requirement in property (d) for t+ 1:
gℓ,t+1k = gν¯ , ∀ k ≥ kt+1 := max
{
kt, max
v˜∈V (s)
kτv˜ + 1
}
.
Define the transition probability distributions µℓ,t+1k and p
ℓ,t+1
k by
µℓ,t+1k (· | i¯) = P
k
3 (Y = · | X = i¯), ∀ i¯ ∈ So, (A.13)
pℓ,t+1k (· | i¯, u¯) = P
k
3 (Z = · | X = i¯, Y = u¯), ∀ (¯i, u¯) ∈ R
1
o. (A.14)
In the right-hand sides of Eqs. (A.13)-(A.14), in case an event that is conditioned on has probability
zero, the corresponding conditional probability, which can be defined arbitrarily, is defined according
to the proper policy µ or the transition probabilities of SSP(ν¯) as:
P k3 (Y = · | X = i¯) = µ(· | i¯), if P
k
3 (X = i¯) = 0;
P k3 (Z = · | X = i¯, Y = u¯) = p
i¯u¯
ν¯ , if P
k
3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) = 0.
The desired equalities (A.10)-(A.11) then hold by these definitions. We now verify that µℓ,t+1k and
pℓ,t+1k satisfy the requirements in properties (b) and (d) for t+ 1.
First, we show that pℓ,t+1k satisfies the requirement in property (b):
pℓ,t+1k (· | i¯, u¯) ∈ N¯δ
(
pi¯u¯ν¯
)
, ∀ (¯i, u¯) ∈ R1o.
This holds by definition if P k3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) = 0, so we consider the case P
k
3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) > 0. By
the induction hypothesis and by the definitions we made for the case s = 0, Pℓt and P
ℓv˜
τv˜
, v˜ ∈ V (s),
all have the product form given in property (b). Using the definition of P k1 and P
k,v˜
2 , we then have
that for all j¯ ∈ So,
P k1 (X = i¯, Y = u¯, Z = j¯) = P
ℓ
t
(
ik = i¯, uk = u¯
)
· pℓ,tk (j¯ | i¯, u¯),
P k,v˜2 (X = i¯, Y = u¯, Z = j¯) = P
ℓv˜
τv˜
(
ik−1 = i¯, uk−1 = u¯
)
· pℓv˜,τv˜k−1 (j¯ | i¯, u¯), v˜ ∈ V (s).
This implies that for every (¯i, u¯) ∈ R1o and every v˜ ∈ V (s),
P k1 (Z = · | X = i¯, Y = u¯) = p
ℓ,t
k (· | i¯, u¯), P
k,v˜
2 (Z = · | X = i¯, Y = u¯) = p
ℓv˜,τv˜
k−1 (· | i¯, u¯). (A.15)
Then, since P k3 = (1 − γ)P
k
1 + γ
∑
v˜∈V (s) ν¯s(v˜)P
k,v˜
2 , using Eqs. (A.14), (A.15) and the relation
P k3 (Z = · | X = i¯, Y = u¯) = P
k
3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯, Z = ·)/P
k
3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯), we obtain
pℓ,t+1k (· | i¯, u¯) =
(1− γ)P k1 (X = i¯, Y = u¯)
P k3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯)
· pℓ,tk (· | i¯, u¯)
+
∑
v˜∈V (s)
γ ν¯s(v˜)P
k,v˜
2 (X = i¯, Y = u¯)
P k3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯)
· pℓv˜,τv˜k−1 (· | i¯, u¯). (A.16)
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This shows that pℓ,t+1k (· | i¯, u¯) is a convex combination of p
ℓ,t
k (· | i¯, u¯) and p
ℓv˜,τv˜
k−1 (· | i¯, u¯), v˜ ∈ V (s).
By property (b) of the induction hypothesis,
pℓ,tk (· | i¯, u¯) ∈ N¯δ
(
pi¯u¯ν¯
)
, pℓv˜,τv˜k−1 (· | i¯, u¯) ∈ N¯δ
(
pi¯u¯ν¯
)
, ∀ v˜ ∈ V (s).
Since the set N¯δ
(
pi¯u¯ν¯
)
is convex, it follows that pℓ,t+1k (· | i¯, u¯) ∈ N¯δ
(
pi¯u¯ν¯
)
, so it satisfies the requirement
in property (b).
Reasoning similarly, and using property (d) of the induction hypothesis, it follows that for all
(¯i, u¯) ∈ R1o,
pℓ,t+1k (· | i¯, u¯) = p
i¯u¯
ν¯ , ∀ k ≥ kt+1.
So pℓ,t+1k satisfies the requirement in property (d) for t+ 1.
We now verify that µℓ,t+1k satisfies the requirements in properties (b) and (d) for t+ 1. Similar
to the preceding proof, for each i¯ ∈ So, either µ
ℓ,t+1
k (· | i¯) = µ(· | i¯) (when P
k
3 (X = i¯) = 0), or it can
be expressed as a convex combination of µℓ,tk (· | i¯) and µ
ℓv˜ ,τv˜
k−1 (· | i¯), v˜ ∈ V (s):
µℓ,t+1k (· | i¯) =
(1− γ)P k1 (X = i¯)
P k3 (X = i¯)
· µℓ,tk (· | i¯) +
∑
v˜∈V (s)
γ ν¯s(v˜)P
k,v˜
2 (X = i¯)
P k3 (X = i¯)
· µℓv˜ ,τv˜k−1 (· | i¯).
It then follows from properties (b) and (d) of the induction hypothesis that supp
(
µℓ,t+1k (· | i¯)
)
⊂ U (¯i)
for all i¯ ∈ So, and µ
ℓ,t+1
k = µ for k ≥ kt+1, which are the requirements in properties (b) and (d).
For k = 1: The arguments in this case are similar to those for k ≥ 2. We start with the same
definitions. Let P 11 denote the law of (i1, u1, i2) under P
ℓ
t , and for each v˜ ∈ V (s), let P
1,v˜
2 denote
the law of (i0, u0, i1) under P
ℓv˜
τv˜
. Let P 13 denote the convex combination of them, given by Eq. (A.8).
Define the random variables X,Y and Z on the sample space Ω˜ = So × U × So as in the preceding
case of k ≥ 2. Let I[· · · ] denote the indicator function which takes the value 1 if the expression
inside [· · · ] is true and takes the value 0 otherwise. Since for every v˜ ∈ V (s),
P 1,v˜2 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) = P
ℓv˜
τv˜
(i0 = i¯, u0 = u¯) = I
[
i¯ = s, u¯ = u˜
]
, (¯i, u¯) ∈ R1o,
we have
P 13 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) = (1− γ)P
1
1 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) + γ I
[
i¯ = s, u¯ = u˜
]
, (¯i, u¯) ∈ R1o. (A.17)
Notice that supp(P 13 ) ⊂ R
1
o × So because (s, u˜) = (j
ℓ
t , u
ℓ
t) ∈ R
1
o and supp(P
1
1 ) ⊂ R
1
o × So by
property (b) of the induction hypothesis (in particular, the property of µℓ,t1 ). Hence we can write
the term C1 in Eq. (A.4) as
C1 =
∑
i¯∈So
∑
u¯∈U (¯i)
P 13 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) · g
ℓ,t+1
1 (¯i, u¯), (A.18)
where gℓ,t+11 (¯i, u¯) for every (¯i, u¯) is defined as: if P
1
3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) = 0, then g
ℓ,t+1
1 (¯i, u¯) = gν¯ (¯i, u¯);
otherwise,
gℓ,t+11 (¯i, u¯) =
(1 − γ)P 11 (X = i¯, Y = u¯)
P 13 (X = i¯, Y = u¯)
· gℓ,t1 (¯i, u¯) +
γ I
[
i¯ = s, u¯ = u˜
]
P 13 (X = i¯, Y = u¯)
·
∑
v˜∈V (s)
ν¯s(v˜) g
ℓv˜,τv˜
0 (s, u˜, v˜),
(A.19)
which, for (¯i, u¯) 6= (s, u˜), is gℓ,t+11 (¯i, u¯) = g
ℓ,t
1 (¯i, u¯).
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We verify that gℓ,t+11 satisfies the requirement in property (c) for t+ 1: g
ℓ,t+1
1 ∈ N¯δ(gν¯). By the
definition of N¯δ(gν¯), what we need to show is that for each (¯i, u¯) ∈ R1o,∣∣gℓ,t+11 (¯i, u¯)− gν¯ (¯i, u¯)∣∣ ≤ δ, and gℓ,t+11 (¯i, u¯) = 0 if i¯ = 0. (A.20)
From the definition of gℓ,t+11 and the fact that g
ℓ,t
1 ∈ N¯δ(gν¯) [property (c) of the induction hypothesis],
we see that Eq. (A.20) is obviously true for all (¯i, u¯) 6= (s, u˜) and for the case where gℓ,t+11 (¯i, u¯) =
gν¯ (¯i, u¯). This leaves us only one case to consider: (¯i, u¯) = (s, u˜) and g
ℓ,t+1
1 (s, u˜) is given by Eq. (A.19).
By Eq. (A.19), gℓ,t+11 (s, u˜) is a convex combination of g
ℓ,t
1 (s, u˜) and
∑
v˜∈V (s) ν¯s(v˜) g
ℓv˜,τv˜
0 (s, u˜, v˜).
If s = 0, then the latter two terms both equal 0 by the induction hypothesis and by our definition
of gℓv˜,τv˜0 for s = 0, and consequently g
ℓ,t+1
1 (0, 0) = 0 as desired. Consider now the case s 6= 0. By
property (c) of the induction hypothesis,
gℓv˜,τv˜0 ∈ N¯δ(g), ∀ v˜ ∈ V (s).
Since gν¯(s, u˜) =
∑
v˜∈V (s) ν¯s(v˜)g(s, u˜, v˜) [cf. Eq. (4.3) in Definition 4.1 for SSP(ν¯)], this implies that∣∣∣gν¯(s, u˜)− ∑
v˜∈V (s)
ν¯s(v˜) g
ℓv˜,τv˜
0 (s, u˜, v˜)
∣∣∣ ≤ δ, if s 6= 0.
Combining the preceding relations with the induction hypothesis that gℓ,t1 ∈ N¯δ(gν¯), we have∣∣gℓ,t+11 (s, u˜)− gν¯(s, u˜)∣∣ ≤ δ, and gℓ,t+11 (s, u˜) = 0 if s = 0,
which is Eq. (A.20) for (¯i, u¯) = (s, u˜). This proves that gℓ,t+11 ∈ N¯δ(gν¯), which is the requirement in
property (c).
We define the transition probability distributions µℓ,t+11 , p
ℓ,t+1
1 by Eqs. (A.13), (A.14), respec-
tively, for k = 1, so that Eqs. (A.10)-(A.11) hold for k = 1 as well. Evidently µℓ,t+11 satisfies the
requirement in property (b) for t + 1, because supp(P 13 ) ⊂ R
1
o × So as discussed earlier. We now
verify that pℓ,t+11 satisfies the requirement in property (b) for t+ 1, namely,
pℓ,t+11 (· | i¯, u¯) ∈ N¯δ
(
pi¯u¯ν¯
)
, ∀ (¯i, u¯) ∈ R1o. (A.21)
Similar to the analysis given earlier for the case k ≥ 0, we have that for every (¯i, u¯) ∈ R1o, either
P 13 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) = 0 and p
ℓ,t+1
1 (· | i¯, u¯) = p
i¯u¯
ν¯ by definition, or P
1
3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) > 0 and
pℓ,t+11 (· | i¯, u¯) can be expressed as the convex combination
pℓ,t+11 (· | i¯, u¯) =
(1− γ)P 11 (X = i¯, Y = u¯)
P 13 (X = i¯, Y = u¯)
· pℓ,t1 (· | i¯, u¯)
+
γ I
[
i¯ = s, u¯ = u˜
]
P 13 (X = i¯, Y = u¯)
·
∑
v˜∈V (s)
ν¯s(v˜) p
ℓv˜,τv˜
0 (· | s, u˜, v˜). (A.22)
For (¯i, u¯) 6= (s, u˜), Eq. (A.22) is pℓ,t+11 (· | i¯, u¯) = p
ℓ,t
1 (· | i¯, u¯); since p
ℓ,t
1 (· | i¯, u¯) ∈ N¯δ
(
pi¯u¯ν¯
)
by
property (b) of the induction hypothesis, to prove Eq. (A.21), we only have one case left to consider:
(¯i, u¯) = (s, u˜) and pℓ,t+11 (· | s, u˜) is given by Eq. (A.22). Now if s = 0, then (¯i, u¯) = (s, u˜) = (0, 0)
and we have pℓ,t+11 (0 | 0, 0) = 1 as desired, because p
ℓ,t
1 (0 | 0, 0) = 1 by the induction hypothesis and
pℓv˜,τv˜0 (0 | 0, 0, 0) = 1 by our definition of p
ℓv˜,τv˜
0 for s = 0. So consider the case (¯i, u¯) = (s, u˜) 6= (0, 0).
By property (b) of the induction hypothesis,
pℓv˜,τv˜0 (· | s, u˜, v˜) ∈ N¯δ
(
pℓv˜o
)
, v˜ ∈ V (s). (A.23)
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In view of Eq. (4.2) in the definition of SSP(ν¯) [Definition 4.1], psu˜ν¯ =
∑
v˜∈V (s) ν¯s(v˜)p
ℓv˜
o , and
therefore, the relation (A.23) implies that∑
v˜∈V (s)
ν¯s(v˜) p
ℓv˜,τv˜
0 (· | s, u˜, v˜) ∈ N¯δ
(
psu˜ν¯
)
.
Using this fact and the induction hypothesis that pℓ,t1 (· | s, u˜) ∈ N¯δ
(
psu˜ν¯
)
, we obtain from the convex
combination formula (A.22) that pℓ,t+11 (· | s, u˜) ∈ N¯δ
(
psu˜ν¯
)
. This proves Eq. (A.21) and shows that
pℓ,t+11 satisfies the requirement in property (b) for t+ 1.
Define the Markov chain for t+ 1:
We now define the time-inhomogeneous Markov chain (i0, u0, v0), (i1, u1), (i2, u2), . . . with prob-
ability distribution Pℓt+1, as required in property (a) for t+1. Let the chain start with (i0, u0, v0) =
(i, u, v), and let its transition probabilities have the product forms given in property (b) for t + 1,
where pℓ,t+1k , k ≥ 0, and µ
ℓ,t+1
k , k ≥ 1, are the functions that we defined in the preceding proof. Also
let the time-varying one-stage cost functions gℓ,t+1k , k ≥ 0, be as defined earlier. We have shown
that these transition probabilities and one-stage cost functions satisfy the requirements in properties
(b)-(d). To prove the lemma, what we still need to show is that with our definitions, the expression
given in property (a) equals Q˜t+1(i, u, v).
First of all, our definitions of the transition probabilities and one-stage cost functions for time
t+ 1 ensure that {(ik, uk), k ≥ kt+1} evolves and incurs costs as in SSP(ν¯) under the proper policy
µ [property (d)]. Consequently, EP
ℓ
t+1
[∑∞
k=1 g
ℓ,t+1
k (ik, uk)
]
is well-defined and finite, and the order
of summation and expectation can be exchanged:
EP
ℓ
t+1
[ ∞∑
k=1
gℓ,t+1k (ik, uk)
]
=
∞∑
k=1
EP
ℓ
t+1
[
gℓ,t+1k (ik, uk)
]
.
Now Q˜t+1(i, u, v) =
∑∞
k=0 Ck by Eq. (A.1). Hence, to prove property (a) for t+ 1, that is, to show
Q˜t+1(i, u, v) = g
ℓ,t+1
0 (i, u, v) +
∞∑
k=1
EP
ℓ
t+1
[
gℓ,t+1k (ik, uk)
]
,
we only need to show that
C0 = g
ℓ,t+1
0 (i, u, v), Ck = E
P
ℓ
t+1
[
gℓ,t+1k (ik, uk)
]
, k ≥ 1. (A.24)
The equality for C0 above is true since by definition g
ℓ,t+1
0 (i, u, v) = g˜t+1(i, u, v) = C0 [cf. Eq. (A.6)].
We now prove the second equality in Eq. (A.24) for Ck, k ≥ 1.
For k ≥ 1, recall
Ck =
∑
i¯∈So
∑
u¯∈U (¯i)
P k3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯) · g
ℓ,t+1
k (¯i, u¯)
[cf. Eqs. (A.9), (A.18)]. Hence, to show the desired equality (A.24) for Ck, it is sufficient to show
that
Pℓt+1(ik = i¯, uk = u¯) = P
k
3 (X = i¯, Y = u¯), ∀ (¯i, u¯) ∈ R
1
o. (A.25)
By the definition of Pℓt+1 [which is defined by property (b), as we recall], P
ℓ
t+1(uk = u¯ | ik = i¯) =
µℓ,t+1k (u¯ | i¯) for all (¯i, u¯) ∈ R
1
o, so in view of Eq. (A.10) (which is the defining relation for µ
ℓ,t+1
k ),
the equality (A.25) will be implied if we show
Pℓt+1(ik = i¯) = P
k
3 (X = i¯), ∀ i¯ ∈ So. (A.26)
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We verify Eq. (A.26) by induction on k. For k = 1, from Eq. (A.17) and property (b) of Pℓt , we
have that for every i¯ ∈ So,
P 13 (X = i¯) = (1− γ)P
ℓ
t
(
i1 = i¯
)
+ γ es(¯i)
= (1− γ) pℓ,t0 (¯i | i, u, v) + γ es(¯i)
= (1− γ)qℓt (¯i) + γ ejℓ
t
(¯i)
= qℓt+1 (¯i) = p
ℓ,t+1
0 (¯i | i, u, v) = P
ℓ
t+1(i1 = i¯),
where the last three equalities follow from the definition of qℓt+1 [cf. Eq. (4.9)], the definition of
pℓ,t+10 [Eq. (A.7)], and the definition of P
ℓ
t+1, respectively. Hence Eq. (A.26) holds for k = 1.
Suppose Eq. (A.26) holds for some k ≥ 1. Then, by the definition of Pℓt+1 [i.e., the property (b)],
we have for all j¯ ∈ So,
Pℓt+1(ik+1 = j¯) =
∑
i¯∈So
∑
u¯∈U (¯i)
Pℓt+1(ik = i¯) · µ
ℓ,t+1
k (u¯ | i¯) · p
ℓ,t+1
k (j¯ | i¯, u¯)
=
∑
i¯∈So
∑
u¯∈U (¯i)
P k3 (X = i¯) · µ
ℓ,t+1
k (u¯ | i¯) · p
ℓ,t+1
k (j¯ | i¯, u¯)
= P k3 (Z = j¯) = P
k+1
3 (X = j¯),
where the second equality follows from the induction hypothesis, the third equality follows from
Eqs. (A.10)-(A.11), and the last equality follows from the definition of P k3 and P
k+1
3 . This completes
the induction and proves that Eq. (A.26) holds for all k ≥ 1, which in turn proves that Eq. (A.25)
holds for all k ≥ 1. Consequently, for all k ≥ 1, the desired equality (A.24) for Ck holds. This
completes the proof of Lemma 4.5.
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